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ACROSS FOUR APRILS:
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION IN VIRGINIA
Ashley McDonald Deija *

I. INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, proposed "to
diffuse knowledge more generally through the mass of the people" for the
purpose of "rendering the people safe, as they are the ultimate guardians
of their own liberty." 1 He said:
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories.
And to render even them safe their minds must be improved to a
certain degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be
essentially necessary. An amendment of our constitution must here
come in aid of the public education. The influence over government
must be shared among all the people. 2

The first Virginia constitutional provision discussing education was
included in the 1870 constitution and required a "uniform system offree
public schools." 3 Provisions for education in the state constitution have
evolved and become more forceful over the years. In 1971, in response to
massive resistance to racial integration, an Education Article and the
Standards of Quality were added to the constitution. 4 Prior to 1971, the
Virginia Constitution had not required local school boards to operate
public schools in their districts or to ensure that their schools met
minimum standards. The constitution thus permitted localities to resist
* Associate, Shaw Pittman L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; B.A., University of Virginia; ).D., Yale Law
School. I would like to thank Professor jim Ryan and all the participants in his School l'inance
Litigation Seminar at Yale for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to
thank my husband, Denis Delja, for his support during the many months of research and writing.
1. Thomas jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 146, 148 (William Peden ed., U.N.C.
Press 1982) (internal punctuation altered).
2. Id. at 148-149.
3. Norma E. Szakal, The Governing Structure of Public Education in Virginia, 73 Va. News
Letter 1, 2 (july 1997).
4. Nancy Finch, Financing Public Education: Northern Virginia Could Lose, 1 Mason 8, 10
(Spring 1991).
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school desegregation by closing all public schools in a district or by
operating such low quality public schools that all but the poorest students,
who were overwhelmingly African American, attended private schools. 5
The Education Article of the 1971 constitution ended constitutionallysanctioned school segregation by requiring that "[t]he General Assembly
shall provide for a system of free public elementary education and
secondary schools for all children of school age throughout the
Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of
high quality is established and continually maintained." 6
It was under that Education Article and the Jefferson-inspired Bill of
Rights that a group of students and school boards from rural counties in
Virginia brought a school finance suit against the state in 1991. The
students brought an "equity suit," claiming that Virginia's school funding
system violated the state constitution by denying students in poor school
districts an educational opportunity substantially equal to that of
students in wealthier districts. 7 Without a trial on the facts of the case,
the Virginia Supreme Court found education to be a fundamental right,
but nevertheless upheld the inequitable funding scheme, saying that
"equal, or substantially equal, funding or programs" were not mandated
by the Virginia Constitution. 8
This case study describes the implications of the equity litigation in
Virginia and seeks to show that Virginia is now ripe for an adequacy suit.
Historically, school finance litigation in Virginia has been characterized
largely by the politics it incited. Part II discusses disparity, and tells that
story: the political ambition, money, racial tension, and regional
favoritism that led up to the eventual filing of Scott v. Commonwealth.
Scott is described in Part III. Part IV explains that politics and
constitutional history were the primary reasons that the litigation failed
in Virginia. Part V explores non-judicial responses to the litigation,
including a funding package from the legislature and, more significantly,
the standards movement. Part VI highlights the great irony of Virginia's
story: the state began to impose curriculum standards to avoid increasing

5. See A.E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia Vol. 2, 883-884 (U.
Press of Va. 1974); Commn. on Constitutional Rev., The Constitution of Virginia: Report of the
Commission on Constitutional Revision 253-254 (1969) [hereinafter Report of the Commission].
6. Va. Const. art. VIII, § I.
7. Bill ofCompl. at 2, Scott v. Cmmw., Ch. No. CH92C00577 (Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond filed june
II, 1992). This jeffersonian commitment to education is embodied in Virginia's current Bill of Rights,
which states: "That free government rests, as does all progress, upon the broadest possible diffusion of
knowledge, and that the Commonwealth should avail itself of those talents which nature has sown so
liberally among its people by assuring the opportunity for their fullest development by an effective
system of education throughout the Commonwealth." Id. at 8 (quoting Va. Const. art. I,§ 15).
8. Scott v. Commw., 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).
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funding during the equity litigation; now those standards invite more
litigation because they buttress an adequacy claim. Part VII concludes
that, because of the standards movement and other factors, Virginia is
ripe for an adequacy suit. As a preface, the paper starts with an overview
of the state, including important regional differences and an explanation
of the school funding system.

A. Overview of the State
Virginia has a population of over 7 million, ranking it twelfth in the
nation. 9 The state's major population centers are the capital city of
Richmond; the suburbs of Washington, D.C., in Northern Virginia; and
the coastal areas of Tidewater. The state's economy was based primarily
on tobacco before the Civil War. 10 Although tobacco is still an important
crop in Virginia, today the state's economy is more broadly based,
including other kinds of agriculture, various industries, coal mining,
military shipbuilding, technology, and government activity. 11 The state
can be divided into several distinct regions, characterized largely by their
economies.

Southside Virginia is a relatively poor section of the state,
characterized by farming and factories. Livestock and tobacco are the
state's leading sources of agricultural income, and the largest industry is
the manufacturing of chemicals and associated products; although these
enterprises are spread across Virginia, they are especially important to

9. U.S. Census Bureau, Virginia QuickFacts <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
5JOOO.html> (last revised july 15, 2003). Virginia shares borders with Maryland, the District of
Columbia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina. Encarta, Virginia (state)
<http:/ I encarta.msn.com/ encnet/refpages/refarticle.aspx ?refid= 761559915> (accessed Feb. 25, 2004)
(follow link to page 3).
10. Encarta, supra n. 9 (follow link to page 2).
II. Encarta, supra n. 9 (main page).
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Southside. 12 Only 35 percent of the farms in the state produce an annual
income of$10,000 or more. 13
Southwest Virginia, in the heart of the Appalachian Mountains, is
coal-mining country. 14 Southwest is mountainous, sparsely populated,
and poor. Along with Southside, its small, rural schools are plagued by
under- funding and hampered by diseconomies of scale. 15
Central Virginia is the mid-point of the state geographically and
economically; the area is characterized by moderate incomes and an
economy reliant on a mixture of the enterprises carried out in all other
portions of the state. The region was once a major tobacco-marketing
center, but it now depends on light industries, including food processing,
electronics, paper, and steel products. 16 Most of the employment in
Central Virginia is government; trade, transportation, and utilities; and
education and health services. 17
The D.C. suburbs of Northern Virginia are labeled the "technology
corridor" because of the number of telecommunications and computer
firms located there, managing the flow of information in and out of
Washington, D.C. Also in Northern Virginia is the Pentagon, housing
the Department of Defense, the leading federal employer in that part of
the state. 18 Northern Virginia is the wealthiest area of the state.
Finally, the Tidewater area, including the cities of Norfolk, Virginia
Beach, and Newport News, is a leading seaport and houses an immense
complex of army, navy, and air force bases. 19 Although Tidewater as a
whole is an affluent region, it encompasses some poor school districts,
and it does not wield the state political power that Northern Virginia
does.

12. Jd. Included in the "chemicals and associated products" sector are firms making plastic
materials and synthetics, drugs, and chemicals used in other industrial processes.
13. Id. Farmland is found across the state and covers more than a third of Virginia's land
area. Crops are grown on about half of that land and the rest is pasture or forest. Because many of
the farms that did not make over $10,000 are side-line jobs, many of the families that are dependant,
at least in part, on farm income do not have to exist on less than $10,000 per year.
14. Id.
15. See Andrew Grinder & Deborah A. Verstegen, Legislation, Litigation and Rural & Small
Schools: A Survey of the States, 26 ). of Educ. Fin. 103 (2000); Canaan Valley Inst., Mid-Atlantic
Highlands Action Program: Transforming the Legacy 27-30 (2003) (available at <http://www.
canaanvi.org/hapReport/index.asp> ).
16. Encarta, supra n. 9.
17. U.S. Dept. of Labor <http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.va_charlottesville.htm> (accessed Mar. 22,
2004); U.S. Dept. of Labor <http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.va_lynchburg.htm> (accessed Mar. 22, 2004).
See also City of Lynchburg <http://www.cityoflynchburg.com/employment/> (accessed Feb. 25, 2004).
18. Encarta, supra n. 9 (follow link to page 3).

19. Jd.

191]

VIRGINIA SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION

195

B. School Governance and Funding

In Virginia, local school divisions have boundaries coterminous with
the cities, counties, and towns in which they are located. Generally, each
city and county in the state runs a school division; most towns are part of
a county-wide system, and some small localities pair with a neighbor to
jointly run a school division. The size of school divisions ranges from
379 students in Highland County to 131,771 students in Fairfax
County. 20 Although there are 137 school divisions statewide, 21 Fairfax
County alone serves more than 13 percent of Virginia's public school
children. 22 In total, lO divisions have fewer than 1,000 students. 23
Until 1992, when the legislature authorized a change, Virginia was
the only state in which all of its local school boards were appointed rather
than elected. 24 Now, the decision whether to elect or appoint is made
locally by the voters; 96 of 137 localities have voted to institute elected
school boards. 25 Still today, however, Virginia remains one of the few
states in which local school divisions do not have the authority to levy
taxes and thus are fiscally dependent on local government. 26 In addition,
no local tax sources are specifically earmarked for public education; local
school boards submit budgets to their county board or city council,
which is responsible for approving the budget and appropriating
money. 27 The relationship between school boards and local government,
therefore, is often contentious. 28

20. Suzette Denslow, Education Finance: Implications for Disparity, U. ofVa. News Letter l, 2
(Nov./Dec. 1995).
21. Kent Dickey & Brian Logwood, Dept. of Educ., Virginia, 1 (2000).
22. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 2.
23. Id.; Dickey, supra n. 21, at 1.
24. For 1st Time, House Backs Bill to Allow Election of Some School Boards in Va., Educ. Week
(Jan. 30, 1991) (available at <http://www.edweek.org/ ew/ ewstory.cfm ?slug= 1012004 7.h 10&
keywords= Brickley> (accessed Feb. 25, 2004)) [hereinafter House Backs Bill]. The General Assembly
had fervently opposed efforts to change to elected school boards because they wanted to insulate the
schools from politics. Szakal, supra n. 3, at 6. In fact, the 1992 bill was introduced and failed
numerous times before passing, including in each of the sixteen preceding years. House Backs Bill,
supra n. 24. Interestingly, "[i]n 1947, the legislature passed a measure allowing popularly elected
school boards. Arlington County [in Northern Virginia] was the only jurisdiction to install such a
board, and it was invalidated in the mid-1950's after board members refused to go along with the
state's policy of'massive resistance' to school desegregation." I d.
25. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 2.
26. Id. at 2-3.

27. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 1.
28. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 2-3.
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C. Funding System
Virginia's three-tiered funding system involves mandatory state and
local funds, voluntary local funds, and federal funds. The federal funds
make up about 5 percent of the school divisions' budget; the state and
local funds are the focus of reform efforts. 29 The state provides a low
level flat grant to local school divisions and then distributes the
remaining portion of the state's contribution through a foundation
program. 30 Localities must contribute a state-specified amount toward
education, and then they have unlimited discretion to supplement the
program through additional taxes. 31

1. Mandatory State and Local Funds: Funding the Standards of Quality
The mandatory state and local funds consist principally of
instructional and support costs required by the statewide Standards of
Quality. 32 The Standards of Quality ("SOQ") are minimum standards set
by the Board of Education that every local school division must meet.
The SOQ define such things as the basic skills students need to gain from
their education, required student-teacher-ratios, Standards of
Accreditation ("SOA''), requirements for diplomas and certificates,
teacher training and professional development, public involvement, and
a policy manuaP 3 The current method for determining the funding of
the Standards of Quality became effective in the 1988-89 school year. 34
The state Department of Education attempts to determine the minimum
reasonable cost of meeting the SOQ per pupil statewide. 35 That cost is
then multiplied by the number of pupils in each school division to
determine the estimated total cost of meeting the SOQ in each division.
That figure is then funded from three sources: the state sales tax,
mandatory local funds, and the state share. 36
One cent of the state's 4.5 cents sales tax is earmarked for education;
29. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 8-9.
30. Deborah A. Verstegen, Financing the New Adequacy: Towards New Models of State
Education Finance Systems That Support Standards Based Reform, 27 ). ofEduc. Fin. 749,755 (2002).
31. Id.; Bill ofCompl., supra n. 7, at 8-9.
32. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 8-9.
33. Va. Code Ann.§§ 22.1-253.13:1 to 22.1-253.13:8 (2003).
34. Dickey, supra n. 21, at I.
35. The formulas for determining the statewide costs include adjustments for special factors,
such as a "cost of competing" factor for Northern Virginia to reflect the higher cost of living there
and a scarcity factor for the increased transportation costs of geographically large districts. Id. at 8;
Andrew Grinder & Deborah A. Verstegcn, Legislation, Litigation and Rural & Small Schools: A
Survey of the States, 26 ). ofEduc. Fin. 103, 117 (2000).
36. See joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Commn., Funding the Standards of Quality, Part I: Assessing
SOQ Costs (1986) [hereinafter )LARC !]; Denslow, supra n. 20, at 3; Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 9.
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those funds are distributed to the localities as a flat grant on the basis of
school-age population residing in the locality. 37 Each district's share of
the sales tax revenue is subtracted from the cost of funding the SOQ in
that district before computing the mandatory state and local shares. 38
Virginia uses an ability-to-pay measure called the Local Composite
Index ("LCI") to determine the state and local shares of funding the
SOQ. 39 The LCI is a measure oflocal fiscal capacity, taking into account
the district's real estate values, adjusted gross income, and retail sales. 40
Divisions with higher LCis have higher mandatory local expenditures for
the funding of the SOQ. 41 As in most states, the major source of local
revenue for education is real estate property taxes. 42
The state makes up the remaining cost of meeting the SOQ, above
what the locality can pay according to its LCI. The "state share" is thus
the state-estimated cost of funding the SOQ in a locality, minus the
locality's share of the sales tax revenue, minus the mandatory local
expenditure. 43 The state share is funded through the state general funds
appropriated by the General Assembly. 44
Thus, the composite index segment of the formula calls for more
state funding per pupil for school divisions with lower wealth. 45
However, an 80 percent cap guarantees that no school division ever pays
more than 80 percent of the costs for funding the SOQ; the 80 percent
limit ensures that the Commonwealth shares the cost of education with
all school divisions, including those with fiscal capacities that could
otherwise bear the entire cost of funding the SOQ.46

2. Voluntary Local Funds

In addition to its mandatory local expenditure, a locality may raise

37. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 4.
38. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 9-10. More specifically, the LCI takes into account the value of real estate and
public service corporations in a district (weighted 50 percent), the district's adjusted gross income
(weighted 40 percent), and its taxable retail sales (weighted 10 percent).
41. Id. at 10. In 1998-99, the statewide average local share was 45 percent. Dickey, supra n.
21, at 5.
42. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 2.
43. Bill ofCompl., supra n. 7, at 10.
44. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 1.
45. Memo. in Support of Respt's Demr., at 18-19, Scott v. Cmmw., Ch. No. CH92C00577-00
(Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond filed Aug. 14, 1992).
46. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 10. For 1998-99, for example, the state share ranged from
81.39 percent to 20 percent of the SOQ cost. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 6.

198

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2004

and spend unlimited additional funds on public education. 17 Such funds
pay for additional teachers, staff, course offerings, books, other
instructional materials, and equipment, and generally pay for capital
outlays. 48 It is the addition of these voluntary funds that allows wealthier
districts to far surpass poorer districts in school spending.
Localities almost always spend more money on public education than
the SOQ demands. In 1990-91, when Scott was filed, budgeted local
expenditures exceeded the mandatory local expenditures by an average of
118 percent. The sum of money localities raised and spent in addition to
their Required Local Expenditures ranged from 3 percent to 242 percent
across the state. 49
Vast differences in education funding throughout the state arise
because localities differ in their willingness and ability to supplement the
mandatory funding. Voters in some areas place a higher value on
education than in other areas, and wealthier areas are able to raise far
more money for the same tax effort than poorer areas. Revenue capacity
is one measure of the ability of a locality to raise tax revenue to support
public services. In 1985-86, five localities had revenue capacities of less
than $2,000 per pupil, while four localities had revenue capacities in
excess of $10,000 per pupil. 5°
II. DISPARITY

Disparity first became a widely-debated issue during the integration
struggles of the 1950s, and Virginia's governors have been outspoken on
the topic ever since. In 1964, former Governor Colgate Darden urged a
"first-rate public school education for every child." 51 In the early 1970s,
Governor Linwood Holton fought to keep public schools open during
integration and led by example, keeping his own children in the
tumultuous Richmond public schools. 52 In 1984, Governor Charles
Robb's education commission said, "Equality is an illusion when the
ability of Virginia's wealthiest school divisions to support education out
of their own resources is ten times greater than that of its poorest school
divisions." 53 In 1986, Governor Gerald Baliles' education commission

47. See Va. Code Ann.§§ 22.1-94 to 22.1-95 (2003).
48. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 10.
49. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 10-11.
50. )oint Legis. Audit and Rev. Commn., Funding the Standards of Quality, Part II: SOQ Costs
and Distribution 50 (1987) [hereinatier jLARC II].
51. Finch, supra n. 4, at 12.
52. Id.
53. )LARC II, supra n. 50, at 21.
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said that disparity was a major obstacle to the success of Virginia's
education system. 54
In the early days of the 1990 General Assembly session, disparity was
once again a heated topic. In January 1990, the state Board of Education
lent their voice to the debate by passing a resolution calling for the
General Assembly, the Governor, and the Secretary of Education to study
and deal with the statewide disparities in public education. 55 The
resolution quoted the education provisions in the Virginia Constitution
and suggested that the state was legally required to address the
Board members cited consensus among school
disparities. 56
superintendents and the desire to avoid a court battle as reasons for the
resolution. W.L. Lemmon, a former state delegate, and James W. Dyke,
Jr., who would become the state's Secretary of Education a few days after
the resolution was passed, were both board members. 57
When Governor Douglas Wilder was inaugurated the following
week, he became the first African American governor in the U.S.-a
remarkable event for a state that once housed the capital of the
Confederacy.
Governor Wilder inherited from the previous
administration both the disparity debate and a budget that called for
spending $2.2 billion more than the state had in revenues. 58 One of
Wilder's first official actions was to appoint the Governor's Commission
on Educational Opportunity for All Virginians, chaired by W.L.
Lemmon. The "Disparity Commission," as it became known, was
directed to study equity in Virginia's education system and issue a report
with recommendations in February of 1991. 59
A. ]LARC

The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission ("JLARC") is an
oversight organization established by the General Assembly to improve
government efficiency. JLARC is composed of nine members of the
House of Delegates and five members of the Senate; at least half of the
Commission members must also serve on their chamber's Appropriations

54. Finch, supra n. 4, at 12.
55. Rob Walker, Education Board Urges Action to End Disparity, Richmond Times-Dispatch
A-1 (Jan. 13, 1990).
56. Id. at A-7.
57. !d. at A-1.
58. Rill Wasson, Wilder Faces Future with Record as Issue, Richmond Times-Dispatch I (Sept.
21, 1991); Va. Educ. Assn., VEA Prescription For Funding a System of High Quality Education in the
Commonwealth, 5 (june 1993) [hereinafter VEA Prescription].
59. Tyler Whitley, School-Fund Suit Would Slow State Efforts, Wilder Says, Richmond TimesDispatch 11 (Apr. 17, 1991).
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or Finance Committee. JLARC staff members are professionals with
experience in legislative budgeting, management analysis, and accounting.
The staff conducts performance audits, program evaluations, and other
policy and fiscal studies to evaluate the effectiveness of state programs.
Based on these studies, the Commission makes recommendations to
improve state government performance, to correct problems the studies
identify, and to better effectuate legislative intent. 60
JLARC issued a total of three reports on education. The first two
reports ("JLARC I" and "JLARC II") were presented in 1986 and 1987,
respectively, and were in response to complaints that the state was not
doing enough to fund the SOQ. JLARC I dealt only with the costs of
implementing the existing SOQ, and JLARC II addressed concerns about
the equity of funding for school divisions. These two JLARC reports
found that state funding to localities was not sufficient for the localities to
meet the demands of the SOQ (in fact, state funding to education had
actually declined from 1978 to 1982) and that great inequities in school
funding existed between wealthy and poor districts.
JLARC I
recommended a change in the funding formula, and the new formula
became effective after its adoption by the General Assembly in 1986.61
JLARC II recommended both pupil equity and tax equity as goals. 62
Unfortunately, the new formula had as many problems as the old
one. The new formula did direct more state funds towards funding the
SOQ, but it did so, in part, by directing state funds away from other
education expenditures, such as employee benefits, that the localities
then had to step in and provide. 63 In addition, the new JLARC formula
focused on aggregated minimum costs in a way that far understated the
school districts' actual costs of funding the SOQ.64
B. Coalition for Equity

In early 1990, a group of about ten school superintendents from
southwestern Virginia who agreed that the new JLARC formula was
failing, and began to meet and discuss what could be done. 65 The group
was formed "out of desperation" because "the disparities were getting
worse and worse . . . People were discouraged." 66 By May of 1990 the
60. Va. Code Ann. §§ 30.56 et seq. {2003); joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Commn., Va.
Information Online <http://jlarc.state.va.us> (accessed jan. 14, 2004).
61. Finch, supra n. 4, at 11; see }LARC I, supra n. 36; see jLARC II, supra n. 50, at 50.
62. JLARC II, supra n. 50, at 50.
63. Finch, supra n. 4, at 11.
64. VEA Prescription, supra n. 58, at 2.
65. Finch, supra n. 4, at 11.
66. Telephone Interview with Ralph Shotwell, Dir. of Div. of Fin., Research, Retirement, and
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group had become the Coalition for Equity in Educational Funding,
comprised of forty-one school boards and superintendents, mostly from
rural southern and southwestern Virginia. The Coalition intended to put
pressure on the state to eliminate the funding inequities. 67 Coalition
members originally defined their role as lobbyists, but court involvement
loomed in the background of their discussions. 68 Disparity Commission
chairman W.L. Lemmon was sympathetic to their cause, but he said
repeatedly that he hoped they would hold off on filing a suit, "which he
expect[ed] the state would lose," and let the Commission do its work. 69
Throughout this time, all parties to the state-level discussions about
disparity-the Commission, the Coalition, the Governor, the Attorney
General, and members of the General Assembly-sought and encouraged
non-judicial remedies, but all discussions occurred very much in the
shadow of litigation. Interestingly, members of the state administration
anticipated an unequivocal loss in court if the funding system was
challenged. Experts warned the Disparity Commission that since
"Virginia's educational funding system would not stand up to a legal
challenge," they must "agree on recommendations to close funding gaps
and avert a lawsuit." 70 State officials noted that similar lawsuits had been
successful in other states and believed Virginia would probably lose. 71 At
the critical November 1990 meeting of the Commission, members
believed that they had to ameliorate the school funding disparities or they
would be taken to court and lose: "Either we will do it or someone else
will do it for us," the Secretary of Education said. 72
In September of 1990, the Coalition retained former Attorney
General Andrew P. Miller, who was then practicing law in Washington,
D.C. Members of the Disparity Commission and Education Secretary
James W. Dyke urged the Coalition to wait for the Disparity
Commission's report before filing suit. Dr. Mark Pace, president of the
Coalition, said that members of the Coalition were divided as to whether
or not to commence legal action. 73 Virginia's path to litigation, therefore,
differed from that of many of the other states involved in school funding
Spec. Serv., Va. Educ. Assn. (Mar. 31, 2003).
67. Paul Bradley, School Financing Considerations Moving Closer to Court Solution, Richmond
Times-Dispatch 17 (Sept. 26, 1990).
68. Id.; Suit Challenges Virginia's School Finance System, Educ. Week (Nov. 27, 1991).
69. Finch, supra n. 4, at 11.
70. Paul Bradley, Panel Tries to Avert Lawsuit, Close School Funding Gap, Richmond TimesDispatch 17 (Nov. 14, 1990).
71. Id.
72. Paul Bradley, Any Way School-Funds Pie Is Sliced, It's Not Enough, Official Says,
Richmond Times-Dispatch 7 (Nov. 15, 1990).
73. Bradley, supra n. 67, at 17.
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suits in that it was driven by a coalition of educators and administrators
rather than by lawyers.
Members who urged judicial action feared that the $1.4 billion
budget deficit made all of the options that would increase funding
politically impossible. Therefore, they were loath to wait for the political
system to come to that conclusion on its own, leaving the schools without
funding in the interim. 74 As quoted in a newspaper article at the time,
Dr. Pace said, "We aren't going to court [yet], but if we can't find a
solution in the Commission and in the legislature, we will go." 75

C. Disparity Commission's Recommendations
The Commission made its recommendations in February 1991,
under strict deadline pressure from Governor Wilder. Late in 1990, the
Commission had asked for an extension of their original February 28,
1991 deadline so they could work out issues that proved to be thornier
than expected. However, Wilder denied the extension and even pushed
up the deadline to February 1, forcing the Commission to come to
hurried conclusions and send a report to the General Assembly. 76
When the Commission submitted its report to the General Assembly,
its first conclusion was that "all divisions, regardless of their local wealth,
currently exceed the standards ... suggest[ing] that the divisions view the
[SOQ] as too minimal to provide a quality foundation program." 77
However, none of the thirty-two recommendations in the Commission
report specifically called for more money from the state. A $1.4 billion
budget deficit made finding additional funds difficult or impossible,
especially considering that Governor Wilder had called for across-theConsequently, instead of
board cuts in all state agencies. 78
recommending more funds, the Disparity Commission recommended
statewide standards and a redistribution of funds from wealthier districts
to poorer ones.
1. Standards as a Substitute for Funding

Faced with a state budget deficit, the Disparity Commission was
urged to "look beyond money" in making recommendations to improve
education in the state, and those non-fiscal recommendations were the

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Finch, supra n. 4, at 9.

77. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 6 (quoting Gov.'s Commn. on Educ. Opportunity for All
Virginians, Final Report 3 (August 1991)).
78.

Bradley, supra n. 72.
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first to gain approvaF 9 For example, the Commission recommended
that the General Assembly establish statewide education goals and
curriculum by 1995, which would be measured by a common statewide
standardized test. 80 Thus, the current standards movement in Virginia
was initiated when state officials attempted to define educational equity
as common standards across the state rather than common funding
across the state. 81 The chair of one of the Disparity Commission's three
subcommittees was quoted in a newspaper as saying, "If we want to talk
about equal opportunity, we have to talk about what students should
know." 82 The recommendation further called for a system of financial
penalties for school systems that failed to meet the new statewide goals. 83
2. Redistribution

A controversial recommendation called for the redistribution of
funds from wealthy Northern Virginia schools to needier schools in the
south of the state. 84 Northern Virginia legislators, predictably, found that
recommendation unacceptable. 85 Under state law, a locality pays a
maximum of 80 percent of the cost of meeting the Standards of Quality.
Wealthy districts pay the maximum 80 percent, plus they pay additional
money to provide students with services and opportunities above the
Standards of Quality. Education officials suggested raising that 80
percent cap to 85 or 90 percent and redirecting those funds to poorer,
smaller school districts in rural Virginia. However, Senators on the
committee worried that the change would be hard for legislators from
Northern Virginia to take back to their constituents, even though a state
study showed that the wealthy, Northern Virginia localities could bear
the costs most easily. 86 The study, done by the state Commission on
Local Government, calculated "fiscal stress" by measuring the locality's
tax base, the effort the locality makes to raise revenue, and the residents'

79. Id. Interestingly, several other states have tried to use standards as a substitute for
funding, including Ohio, West Virginia, Connecticut, and New jersey.
80. Bradley, supra n. 70.
81. In 1990, the state already had literacy passport tests in place, but it was not mandatory for
students to pass them before being promoted to high school until1991. Walker, supra n. 55, at Al.
82. Bradley, supra n. 70.
83. Id.
84. Bradley, supra n. 72. Redistributive school finance plans such as this one are often called
"recapture" or "Robin Hood" plans and generate great political opposition. Michael Heise, State
Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave:" From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp.
L. Rev. 1I5I,1172 (1995).
85. Bradley, supra n. 72.
86. jean McNair, Shifting Funds to Poorer Areas Said Way to Save School Money, Richmond
Times-Dispatch 21 (Aug. 9, 1990).
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ability to pay taxes. The study showed that the suburban counties in
Northern Virginia had the least fiscal stress while the rural counties in
southwest and south-central Virginia had the most. 87 Along with
legislators from Northern Virginia, however, Governor Wilder stated
repeatedly that he would not support taking money from wealthier
school districts to aid the poorer districts. 88
D. The Coalition's Ultimatum

State officials, such as Governor Wilder and Secretary of Education
Dyke, clashed with Coalition members repeatedly over the question of
whether the legislature could be counted on to eliminate the disparities.
The state said that, given time to deliberate, the legislature would
adequately address the problem; the serious attention they had given the
Disparity Commission's report was evidence of that. Wilder pointed out
that "[n]o one had to sue me to create the Commission, or for the
legislature to consider its findings." 89 A lawsuit, he said, would have a
"chilling effect" on the current state efforts to solve the problem.
Furthermore, if the issue was turned over to the courts, further
expenditures on Disparity Commission work could be viewed as
wasteful, bringing the Commission's work to an end. 90
But Coalition members feared that the General Assembly did not have
the political will to "find" more money by raising taxes or taking funds
from some school districts, and they thought a lawsuit would be necessary
to force the Assembly into action. 91 Academics and outside observers
agreed that a court decision requiring the state to infuse more money into
education could give politicians the political will they needed to raise taxes
or redistribute funds. 92 The Coalition had considered taking legal action in
1990 but agreed to wait for the Disparity Commission report. As discussed
above, when the report was released in February 1991, it included twentyseven recommendations for ending the disparity but it did not include
details of where the funding would come from. 93 In addition, the Disparity
Commission's report defined the problem in terms that were
unsatisfactory to the Coalition; the Commission focused on three types of
equity-program equity, pupil equity, and fiscal equity-thus diluting the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
(Aug. 20,

Id.

Whitley, supra n. 59.
Id.
Id.
Associated Press, Wilder Plans to Disregard Threat of Suit, Richmond Times- Dispatch 23
1991).

92. Id.
93. Id.
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funding focus that was paramount to the Coalition. The final report stated
that "the Commission did not identify equal per pupil funding across all
districts as a goal, or focus on measuring the current level of fiscal disparity
in the Commonwealth."94
In April 1991, the Coalition, frustrated by the Disparity Commission's
lack of progress, set a September 13 deadline for Wilder to announce a
specific plan to solve school funding disparities. If Wilder missed the
deadline, the Coalition promised to file suit. A spokesperson for Wilder
declared that he would continue to lead the march toward a solution, but
that he would ignore the deadline: "[H]e is not going to be subject to
threats or ultimatums." 95 Wilder and Dyke characterized the ultimatum as
"blackmail" and an effort to "put a gun to the governor's head." 96
The Attorney General during the Wilder administration says that "the
last thing that should have been done when dealing with the Governor was
issue an ultimatum." 47 She describes him as strategic, but unwilling to be
bullied by anybody. 9R A direct ultimatum backfired on the Coalition not
only because of the Governor's personality, but also because of the politics
involved: several people close to Governor Wilder and involved in the
eventual litigation have described a tense relationship between the
Governor and the Coalition, often tinged with racial strain. 99 The racial
undertones of the power struggle between the Coalition and the Governor
raised the stakes and provoked the Governor into digging his heels in
deeper. 100 On the September 13 deadline the Coalition had set for Wilder
to propose a solution to school funding inequities in the state, Wilder did
not address the school funding issue. Instead, he announced that he would
seek the Democratic presidential nomination. Hit
A few days after the deadline passed, the Coalition voted to file the
threatened lawsuit, styled Alleghany Highlands v. Virginia, but not to
serve the papers until after the General Assembly considered the

94. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 6 (quoting Gov.'s Commn. on Educ. Opportunity for All
Virginians, Final Report II).
95. Associated Press, supra n. 91.
96. Disparity's Sting, Richmond Times-Dispatch Al4 (Apr. 24, 1991).
97. Telephone Interview with Mary Sue Terry, former Atty. Gen. ofVa. (Mar. 27, 2003).
98.

Id.

99. Id. However, Wilder opponents note that his administration was apt to find racism in
most criticisms. See, e.g., Robert Eure, Op-Ed, Vindictive Politics Still Alive and Well, The VirginianPilot (Norfolk) A9 (Feb. 14, 1994).
100. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
101. Paul Bradley, School Divisions to Decide on Suit, Richmond Times-Dispatch 41 (Sept. 13,
1991). In fact, Wilder's press secretary Laura F. Dillard resigned around the same time as the
Coalition deadline because she felt the governor's priority was the White House and not the state.
Wasson, supra n. 58.
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education budget in early 1992. 102 The Coalition viewed their delay as a
compromise that would give the Governor and General Assembly one
last chance to close the funding gap without court intervention. The
Governor and General Assembly, however, were largely angered by the
tactic. Wilder took the offensive by trying to serve the lawsuit on himself,
attempting to pick up the legal papers as soon as they were filed in the
Richmond Circuit Court rather than waiting for them to be served. 103
Although the court later ruled that the Governor could pick up the unserved suit from the circuit court, the Coalition decided to withdraw the
suit because they were encouraged by the disparity discussions in the
legislature. Coalition members publicly stated that they believed the
legislature would take the necessary action to close the funding gap. 104
E. The Governor and General Assembly Respond

Days later, still in January of 1992, Governor Wilder submitted his
"Plan for Improving Educational Opportunities for All Virginians," a sixyear plan that called for programmatic and funding reforms in Virginia's
schools. 105 The funding reforms included a $360 million proposed
budget increase for the 1992-94 biennium. However, since budget
shortfalls had reduced the state share of funding the SOQ by $90 million
in the 1991-92 school year, $90 million of the proposed $360 million was
purely to restore that lost funding. The remainder was merely an
allotment for the normal increase in operating costs that could be
expected over the next two years. 106
In addition to the funding reforms, the Wilder administration called
Short-term
for short-term and long-term programmatic reforms.
reforms, designed to be affordable programs that could be implemented
immediately, included at-risk funding for students who received free
lunches, funding for instructional materials, assistance for teacher
recruitment, and funding for children who spoke English as a second

102. Paul Bradley, Governor May Force School Issue, Richmond Times-Dispatch 15 (Sept. 18,
1991); Suit Challenges Virginia's School Finance System, supra n. 68.
103. Bradley, supra n. 101. In late September, the Reverend jesse jackson made a trip to
Virginia to challenge Governor Wilder to support the lawsuit, saying that the disparity goes beyond
race and class because unequal funding results in unequal opportunity. At the time, jackson denied
that his trip was intended as a message to Governor Wilder that he might not be the only African
American seeking the presidency, but jackson announced his candidacy a short time later. See
jeffery St. john, Jackson Challenges Governor to Revamp Funding for Schools, Richmond TimesDispatch 17 (Sept. 26, 1991).
104. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 10.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7.
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language. 107 The long-term reforms, which would require fundamental
changes to the system, included standards-based education, a costing-out
of education based on student needs, a plan for the state to share capital
costs, reduced class sizes in the early grades, and a revised Composite
Index for determining the local share of funding the SOQ. 108
In March, the General Assembly appropriated $74 million in
"disparity initiatives." 109 Although the package was far less than the $1.3
billion the Coalition said was necessary to close the funding gap, and also
less than the $360 million the Governor had proposed, the Governor and
the General Assembly agreed to the initiatives as a "first step" toward
addressing the disparity issue. 110 The meager funding response did not
mollify Coalition members and, in April of 1992, the Coalition voted to
re- file its suit. 111
Ill. CLOSING A DOOR: VIRGINIA'S EQUITY LITIGATION

A. Reid Scott v. Commonwealth
The Coalition filed Reid Scott v. Commonwealth of Virginia in the
Richmond City Circuit Court, alleging that the system of funding for
public schools in the Commonwealth violated the Virginia Constitution
by denying students in the complaining school districts "an educational
opportunity substantially equal to that of children who attend public
school in wealthier divisions." 112
The named plaintiff, Reid Scott, was a seventh-grader at a Buchanan
County public school. Buchanan County borders West Virginia and
Kentucky, in Virginia's coal country in the southwestern part of the state,
and suffered from an under- funded school system. 113 In total, the Bill of
Complaint listed eleven public school students and seven local school
boards as plaintiffs. 114 They asserted that the financing system violated

107. Id.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 2.
113. In the 1991-92 school year, Buchanan County spent $4,945 per student, while Falls
Church spent $9,119 per student, Arlington spent $8,592, and Alexandria spent $8,525. And
Buchanan was not the worst off county in the state: Total per pupil expenditures ranged from $9,139
in Falls Church to $3,819 in South Boston. See joel Turner, He's the Kid in the Suit, The Roanoke
Times & World News E1 (Mar. 27, 1994); joel Turner, The Difference is Appropriation, The Roanoke
Times & World News E6 (Mar. 27, 1994).
114. Scott v. Cmmw., No. HC-77-1, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond Nov. 20, 1992). The
parties who initiated the suit were members of the Coalition for Equity in Educational Funding,
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the constitution because the "Constitution of Virginia requires the
General Assembly to provide for a substantially equal public educational
opportunity for every child in the Commonwealth by mandating a single,
statewide public educational system." 115 As a result of the state funding
formulas, school divisions with low fiscal capacities "have less funding
per pupil for the education of pupils residing in those divisions than do
divisions with high fiscal capacities." 116 Therefore, "the Commonwealth
has failed to create a system, i.e., a uniform system, of public education
which provides children throughout the Commonwealth with a
substantially equal educational opportunity." 117
The Bill of Complaint recited the relevant portion of the Virginia
Constitution: "The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free
public education and secondary schools for all children of school age
throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and maintained." 118
Furthermore, the Complainants alleged the Virginia Bill of Rights made
education a fundamental right, saying:
That free government rests, as does all progress, upon the broadest
possible diffusion of knowledge, and that the Commonwealth should
avail itself of those talents which nature has sown so liberally among its
people by assuring the opportunity for their fullest development by an
effective system of education throughout the Commonwealth. 119
The complainants alleged that Virginia's method of financing its
public schools was resulting in gross disparities in school funding among
school divisions. 12° For the 1989-90 school year (the latest year for which
data were available as of the filing of the suit), total state and local per
pupil funding for general education ranged from $2,895 in the poorest
district to $7,268 in the wealthiest district. 121 Funding in the ten poorest
school divisions averaged $2,954 per pupil, while funding in the ten
wealthiest school divisions averaged $6,058 per pupil. 122 Thus the people
of Virginia spent two and a half times more money on some students
than on others, solely on the basis of which school division the student

which was comprised of24 school boards. Bill of Com pl., supra n. 7, at 5-6.
115. Bill of Compl., supra n. 7, at 7.
116. Id. at II.
117. !d. at 14.
118. !d. at 7 (emphasis supplied) (citing Va. Const. art. Vlll, § 1).

119. !d. at 8 (emphasis supplied) (citing Va. Bill of Rights. art. I,§ 15, ~ 2).
120. Bill ofCompl., supra n. 7, at 12.
121. ld. at 11-12.
122. Id. at 12.
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attended. 123 The complainants further alleged that the funding gap was
increasing. 124 In the 1987-88 school year, the gap between the highestfunded and lowest-funded division was $3,844 per pupil. In the 1989-90
school year, the gap was $4,372 per pupil-an increase of 14 percent. 125
The Respondents demurred to the Bill of Complaint. 126 They argued
that the constitution does not require equity in funding, but guarantees
only a basic education for each child in the state: "The complaint must be
dismissed as a matter of law because there are no allegations that the
constitutionally required Standards of Quality program is not available in
any of the complainant school divisions." 127
B. Circuit Court Decision

In the circuit court decision, Judge Hughes first considered the plain
meaning of the words used in the relevant provisions of the constitution.
He noted the plaintiffs' argument that the guarantee in Article I, section
15 of "an effective system of education" necessarily means "substantial
equality among school divisions in Virginia." 128 He disagreed. Hughes
said that the title of the article, "Qualities necessary to preservation of
free government," indicated "more of a general statement of objectives
rather than an affirmative, enforceable duty." 129 Similarly, he wrote, "the
language used that the Commonwealth 'should avail itself ... by assuring
the opportunity ... by an effective system of education,' with the use of
the word 'should,' suggests things traditionally aspirational as opposed to
the word 'shall' which is not used, and which is traditionally
mandatory." 130
Moreover, Judge Hughes disagreed with plaintiffs' assertion that a
unitary, equal system is required by the language of "system of free
public . . . schools for all children of school age throughout the
Commonwealth." 131 Instead, he wrote, "throughout the Commonwealth"

123. ld.
124. ld. at 14.
125. Id.
126. On demurrer, the court must take as true the allegations in the Bill of Complaint (as well
as the reasonable inferences from them). See e.g. Bowman v. St. Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797,
798 (Va. 1985).
127. Demr. at 1-2, Scott v. Cmmw., No. CH92C00577 (Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond july 7, 1992).
The Respondents further argued five other points of law, including that the constitution expressly
vests ultimate authority for education policy in the General Assembly, not in the courts, and that the
suit was barred by sovereign immunity. ld. at 2-3.
128. Scott, slip op. at 6.
129. ld.
130. ld.
131. ld.
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modifies "children of school age," not "system," and therefore no
requirement of equality can be read into that clauseo 132
Importantly, Judge Hughes went on to note that the section "does
require 'an educational program of high quality,' and section 2 requires
the General Assembly to develop the scheme to fund such a programo" 133
Further, he said that "the only funds which must be provided are those
necessary to cover the 'cost of maintaining an educational program
meeting the prescribed standards of quality.' These standards 0 0 0 are the
constitution's own indication of what constitutes 'high quality,' and the
level of educational opportunity for which funds are constitutionally
The Judge contrasted Rose Vo Council for Better
guaranteed.'' 134
Education, Inco, 135 the successful school finance case in Kentucky, with
this action, saying that the critical difference was the allegation of
inadequacy in Rose and inequity in Scott: "Here the complainants do not
allege that the present funding system has failed to reach the Standards of
Quality" or the corollary Standards of Accreditationo 136
Most
importantly, plaintiffs "do not allege that the Standards of Quality or
Accreditation are inadequate to ensure the 'high quality' education
mandated by the Virginia Constitution.'' 137
Ultimately, Judge Hughes wrote that the Virginia Constitution
"establish[es] education as a fundamental right." 138 However, he found
no authority requiring a strict scrutiny test to be applied to the state
constitutional depravation asserted, concluding that "the Virginia
Constitution does not now mandate equality of funding for school
districts in Virginia, except for meeting minimum educational
standardso" 139 Judge Hughes invited Plaintiffs to amend their Bill of
Complaint and file an adequacy suit, but the Plaintiffs decided to stand
on their original Complaint, and judgment was entered against them in
the circuit courto 140
1320 Id.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 7 (internal notations omitted).
Id. (internal notations omitted).
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
Scott, slip op. at 8.

137. Id.

138. Id.at7.
139. Id. at 9. Given this determination, it was not necessary for the court to decide the other
questions raised by the Respondents' demurrer. See text accompanying n. 115.
140. Id. at 9. None of the litigation participants with whom the author spoke provided a clear
answer to the question of why they did not amend the suit at judge Hughes' invitation. Some
suggested that they knew they would lose with the present court anyway, so they did not mind losing
on equity rather than adequacy grounds. Others suggested that they wanted to file an adequacy suit
all along and were simply outvoted by other members of the Coalition. Still others suggest that the
symbolism of an equity suit mattered to them: many poorly-funded schools managed to be adequate,
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C. Further Irony: Reactions of the Participants
The state officials defending the lawsuit were, ironically, promoters
of educational equity and quality themselves. Attorney General Mary
Sue Terry, the daughter of two school teachers, was from a poor, rural
county in Virginia and, as she describes it, "grew up on salary disparity."
Terry says her heart was with the plaintiff districts, but she had a job to
do, and she disagreed with the Coalition's strategy to file a suit because
she had studied the constitutional history in Virginia. Terry even met
with Coalition leadership as a last-ditch effort to discuss with them the
"dire consequences" of losing the suit; she feared that a loss in court
would be a "license to the populace in rich areas to not support the
underserved populations in poorer school districts." She explained:
I believed that fair-minded legislators from across the state believed
they had a moral and constitutional obligation to help these children.
Now there's a case telling them that they have no obligation. Before,
politicians and others could argue that there was a legal obligation to
these children; that option was now gone. Without a legal obligation,
it's politically harder for a legislator to justify increased expenditures for
children in other districts. 141
Similarly, Secretary of Education Jim Dyke-who, like Governor
Wilder, had graduated from a segregated high school-was a strong
advocate of quality, and equality, in education. 142 In fact, before taking
the post of Secretary of Education, Dyke was a member of the Board of
Education that passed the initial resolution to address the disparity
issue. 143 Dyke's strong commitment to solving disparity problems and
working with state legislators was a primary reason cited by the Coalition
for their repeated postponements of the suit. 144 Many involved with the
suit had the sense that Dyke and others listed as defendants in the suit
"would have loved to be required by the court to increase funding." 145

D. Appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia

In the fall of 1993, the plaintiffs (hereinafter, "the Students") filed an
appeal with the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Students' brief alleged
that the circuit court erred in two principle ways. First, they alleged that
but what
141.
142.
143.

they wanted was to be equal.
Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
Denslow, supra n. 20, at 9.
Walker, supra n. 55, at AI.

144. Bradley, supra n. 101.
145. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

212

[2004

the court erred in ruling that the Virginia Constitution does not require a
significant reduction in existing disparities in the funding of public
education among the school divisions. Second, they alleged that the
court erred in ruling that although education was a fundamental right
under the Virginia Constitution, statutory enactments affecting that right
were not subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 146
In their appeal, the Students highlighted a point that was implicit in
the original complaint:
The Students have not urged that the same amount of public monies be
expended on every student in the Commonwealth; rather, the Students
asserted, and asked the Circuit Court to hold, that the extent of the
current disparities in educational funding among the school divisions
of the Commonwealth is constitutionally unsupportable. 147

Further, the Students emphasized that education is a fundamental
right, citing the circuit court's decision below as new authority. The
Students asserted that because education is a fundamental right, the
Commonwealth's statutory funding scheme must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny: 148 "[U]nder a strict scrutiny test, the law must be a
necessary element for achieving a compelling governmental interest." 149
The Students asserted that the circuit court erred in failing to examine
the funding scheme with strict judicial scrutiny, and therefore their
granting of the Commonwealth's demurrer was also in error. 150
Finally, the Students asserted that even if the strict scrutiny test did
not apply, the facts alleged in the Complaint were adequate to require
denial of the Commonwealth's Demurrer. 151 The Students alleged that
because their Bill of Complaint set forth sufficient facts to state a valid
cause of action, the circuit court, in sustaining the Demurrer, "essentially
concluded that certain acts of the General Assembly are not subject to
judicial review, even though they may be unconstitutional." 152

E. Supreme Court Decision
In its decision, the Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the circuit
court that the constitutional provisions at issue were to be examined

146. Br. of Appellants, at 3; Scott v. Cmmw., 443 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 1994).
147. Id. at 8.
148. ld. at 14
149. Id. at 14-15 (citing Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 19R9); Mahan v.
Natl. Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 315 S.E.2d 829,830 (Va. 1984)).
150. Br. of Appellants, at 15; Scott, 443 S.E.2d 141.
151. Id. at 16.
152. Id. at 15.
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under the plain meaning rule. 153 The supreme court also upheld the
lower court's determination that while Article VIII mandates a free
system of public education, the language about "high quality" and an
"effective system" is merely aspirational:
In sum, we agree with the trial court that education is a fundamental
right under the Constitution. Even applying a strict scrutiny test, as
urged by the Students, however, we hold that nowhere does the
Constitution require equal, or substantially equal, funding or programs
among and within the Commonwealth's school divisions ....
Therefore, while the elimination of substantial disparity between school
divisions may be a worthy goal, it is simply not required by the
Constitution. Consequently, any relief to which the Students may be
entitled must come from the General Assembly. 154

And so, on April IS, 1994-three years and four Aprils after the litigation
process began-the students were left with no judicial remedy to the
inequities in education funding in Virginia.
IV. WHY DID SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION FAIL IN VIRGINIA?

Politics and constitutional history are the primary reasons school
finance litigation failed in Virginia. Virginia is a politically conservative
state, and Virginia's judges, as products of her culture, are unlikely to
issue a profoundly redistributive ruling. Similarly, the judges are
appointed by the General Assembly for renewable terms, which makes
them less likely to rule against the state-their once and future
benefactors. In addition, race entered into the disparity litigation in an
important and unusual way in Virginia when the debates between the
state's African American governor and the predominately-white
Coalition for Equity were encumbered by racial tension. Politics across
the state-primarily between the affluent, suburban areas of Northern
Virginia and the poorer, rural areas of Southwest and Southsidehindered attempts at non-legal solutions to the disparity problems.
Finally, the politics of public engagement influenced the failure of
Virginia's equity case; because the disparity debates developed as a
political match between state officials and Coalition members, the public
was largely left out of the debate and hence was unprepared to fully

153. Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 141. The court noted that "[w]hen constitutional language is clear and
unambiguous, a court must give the language its plain meaning and is not allowed to resort to
legislative history or other extrinsic evidence." ld. (citing to Thomson v. Robb, 328 S.E.2d 136, 139
(Va. 1985); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636,644 (Va. 1959)).
154. Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142-143.
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support the efforts for fiscal equity.
The second major factor in the failure of the equity suit was the
constitutional history of the state's Education Article. When the General
Assembly framed and debated the 1971 Virginia Constitution, they were
acutely aware of the school finance litigation going on in other states;
they included language and constructed history meant specifically to
ensure that the state's education funding scheme was litigation-proof.
The first half of this section will explore the five ways politics affected the
equity litigation in Virginia and the second half will explore the
constitutional history.
A. Politics

1. Of the People
The first political factor in the failure of the equity litigation was the
politics of the people. Virginia is an extremely conservative state. A
common saying is that even the liberals in Virginia are conservative,
giving the state's moderate voters the label of "Virginia Democrats." A
study by Erikson, Wright, and Mciver, which assigned liberalism scores
to the states based on an aggregation of polling data, classified Virginia as
a conservative state. Even during the period from 1976 to 1988, when
more citizens of the state identified themselves as Democrats than as
Republicans and when Democrats controlled the General Assembly,
Virginia's liberalism score was a -17.9, placing Virginia solidly within the
conservative block of states. 155
Many studies suggest that the ideology of the public is often related
to judicial decision-making. 156 Karen Swenson's regression analysis
demonstrates a strong correlation between the liberalism of the citizenry
in a state and the judiciary's willingness to "take school finance policy
into their own hands and mandate a change likely to redistribute the
wealth in a state." 157 Conversely, "[m]ore conservative states have
155. Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, & john P. Mciver, Statehouse Democracy 16
(Cambridge U. Press 1993). Similarly, Daniel Elazar asserts that Virginia is a strongly traditionalistic
state. Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 135-136 (3d ed., Harper & Row
1984). judges in traditionalistic states, as products of that culture, are most likely to uphold the
current school funding scheme. But see Paula j. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A FiftyState Analysis, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 1101, 1144 (2000).
156. See Herbert jacob, Courts: The Least Visible Branch, in Politics in the American States: A
Comparative Analysis 253, 281 (Virginia Gray & Herbert jacob eds., 6th ed., CQ Press 1996)
(demonstrating a moderate, positive correlation between a populace's liberal ideology and its
supreme court's willingness to expand privacy rights); Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform
Litigation: Why Are Some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 1147,
1167 (2000).
157. Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1177-1178.
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judiciaries that are more likely to uphold the status quo and defer to the
judgment of the legislature and governor in setting education policy." 158
Swenson's model, therefore, supports the notion that Virginia courts
would uphold the funding scheme as a result of the state's conservative
culture.
2. On the Court

The second political factor in the failure of the equity litigation was
the politics on the court. Judges in Virginia are appointed by a vote of
the General Assembly for terms of twelve years, and at the end of their
term, they can be reappointed by the Assembly for unlimited subsequent
twelve-year terms. 159 Virginia's judicial selection process is unusual in
that the state legislature selects the justices and the justices never "face
the voters" in retention elections. 160 Justices who owe their jobs to state
officials, and who can be reappointed by those officials, are less likely to
vote against them when they appear before the court as defendants. 161
One professor states that because "the justices are appointed, and not for
life, it is often difficult for the justices to separate themselves from the
political arena in Virginia." 162
A recent study exploring why some state courts are activist and
others are restrained supports the idea that appointed justices owe
allegiance to state officials. In that study, Karen Swenson found that
appointed courts uphold school finance schemes more often than elected
courts do. 163 While the difference was only slight in her study, the courts
labeled "appointed" in her sample were actually hybrid courts where "the
distinction between the two selection methods [elected and appointed] is
blurred because many appointed justices face retention elections." 164 In
Virginia, in contrast, justices and judges are purely appointive, so it
stands to reason that the Virginia courts are among the most likely to
uphold school finance schemes.
In addition, the Virginia Supreme Court is a very conservative
court. 165 The centralized judicial selection process serves to encourage
158. Id. at 1177.
159. Va. Const. art. VI, § 7. However, judges must retire at age 70. Am. judicature Socy.,
Judicial Selection in the States: Virginia <http:/ /www.ajs.org/js!V A.htm> (accessed Feb. 27, 2004).
160. Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1153; Va. Const. art. VI,§ 7.
161. See Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1154.
162. Telephone Interview with Richard G. Salmon, Prof., Educ., Leadership, & Policy Stud., Va.
Polytechnic Ins!. & St. U. (Feb. 3, 2003).
163. Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1174.
164. Id. This paper posits that if Swenson's study looked at purely appointed courts versus
purely elected courts, the difference would be far more significant.
165. Telephone Interview with Deborah A. Verstegen, Prof., Educ. Fin. & Policy, Curry Sch. of

216

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2004

politicism on the court; critics and reformers have long contended that
the justices are selected on a partisan basis, rather than on a professional
and quality basis. 166 Conservative courts are more likely to uphold the
school funding status quo and less likely to engage in the redistributive
enterprise of requiring equity in funding. 167 Some parties to the Scott
litigation, knowing the highly conservative nature of the supreme court,
even thought it would be better to withdraw the case than to go ahead
with that court. 16x
3. Between the Governor and the Coalition

The third political factor was the politics between the Governor and
the Coalition. Every party involved in the litigation describes the
extreme antagonism between Governor Wilder and the Coalition. At the
time of the litigation, Governor Wilder was seeking the Democratic
presidential nomination. He was very concerned with having a good
track record in Virginia and he took the disparity suit as a personal
affront. 169
Wilder received the governorship during a tremendous budget crisis
in Virginia. He was very aware of his place in history as the first African
American governor, and he was determined to break stereotypes;
specifically, he wanted to challenge the view that African Americans are
not good at managing money. Through political negotiations and many
hard decisions, Wilder balanced the state budget, and that success
became his crowning glory. The Scott suit, therefore, was a serious blow,
undermining both his national political aspirations and his desire to
dispel racial stereotypes about financial mismanagement. 170
Race thus entered Virginia's school finance story in a unique and
critical way. As discussed previously, the Coalition gave the Governor a
deadline of September 13th by which he had to address the disparity
issue or the Coalition would go to court. Wilder was incensed by this
ultimatum. He, and those around him, perceived a racial undercurrent
to the communications he had with many members of the Coalition. 171
Wilder's response to the ultimatum was to visibly and publicly ignore it.

Educ., U. ofVa. (Apr. 11, 2003).
166. Harry R. Stumpf & john G. Culver, The Politics of State Courts 55 (Longman Publg. Group
1992). The General Assembly welcomes recommendations from bar groups, but there is no formal
system such as a nominating committee to forward the names of qualified nominees.
167. Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1177.
168. Telephone Interview (Salmon), supra n. 162.
169. Id.
170. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
171. Id.
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Not only did he not address the school funding issue on September 13th,
he actually chose that day to announce that he would seek the
Democratic nomination for the presidency. 172
4. Across the State

The fourth political factor was the politics across the state. Northern
Virginia has more wealth and political power than any other region of
the state. All of the highest spending school districts are in Northern
Virginia, and yet schools in that area received increased funds during the
disparity debates even while the lower-spending districts that had called
for the debates languished. Within the state, Northern Virginia has a
reputation as a "fat cat" that can afford to pay for anything its school
systems need. 173 In some ways, that reputation is fair-in 1990, for
example, raising the real estate tax by one cent would have generated $7.8
million in Fairfax County and only $7,600 in Clifton Forge. 174
Furthermore, 90 percent of Fairfax County public school students go on
to higher education-a figure unparalleled throughout the rest of
Virginia. 175 But, as the Fairfax County School Board chair testified to the
Disparity Commission, many of the Northern Virginia districts have
tremendous costs that other districts in the state do not. In Fairfax
County in 1991, for example, the school system paid $8.6 million for an
English as a Second Language ("ESL'') program, remedial help, and
translators for the more than 5,000 Fairfax children from over 150
countries who speak 100 different languages. In addition, Fairfax had
more than 17,000 students in special education in 1991, which was more
than the total enrollment of all but 11 of Virginia's school divisions, at a
cost of $110 million per year. The new JLARC formula had made the
funding situation much worse in affluent systems, and Northern Virginia
school systems at one point had considered joining the Coalition. 176
Some Northern Virginia legislators and voters were angered by the
focus on disparity issues in Southwest and Southside Virginia. They
contended that their high-cost districts, with higher costs of living, more
ESL students, and more special education students, were just as much
victims of disparity since they received less than half of the state money
that many lower-cost districts received. At a Fairfax County School
Board meeting, Northern Virginian school officials were so angered by

172. Bradley, supra n. 101, at A 1.
173. See Finch, supra n. 4, at 12.
17 4. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 4-5.
175. Finch, supra n. 4, at 9.
176. Id.at12.

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

218

[2004

the disparity discussions that they even considered seceding from the
state system. 177
Commentators worried that solutions like redistributing funding
from Northern Virginia to poorer areas of the state would close the
funding gap but create a goodwill gap. 178 Perhaps more influentially,
Northern Virginia legislators made it clear that such redistribution was
unacceptable, and soon Governor Wilder agreed. 179 Mary Sue Terry, the
Attorney General at the time of the Scott litigation, explained that "the
rural areas and the cities are over-ridden by the suburbs because there are
simply more voters and more political power in the 'burbs."' 180
5. Of Timing and Public Opinion

The final political factor in the failure of the equity litigation was the
politics of timing and public opinion. Disparity Commission chairman
W.L. Lemmon said the slow pace of the Commission's work was
deliberate, even before the pace was questioned. Lemmon felt that to
ensure the eventual success of the Commission's recommendations, he
had to win public support for the recommendations before real debate
over them began in the General Assembly. 181 Many commentators,
including school finance veteran Michael Rebell, support Lemmon's
belief about the importance of "extensive public deliberation through
public engagement." 182 Lemmon was adamant that no one should have
resorted to a judicial solution until the Commission had time to finish its
work, give the report to the General Assembly, and rally the public
around its recommendations: "My personal view is that any report we
come out with will take a lot of understanding from the general public,
and that will take time." 183
Research suggests that the effectiveness of court activity in
contentious areas depends largely on the existence of broader political
support for the activity. 184 In retrospect, some of the people involved

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Bradley, supra n. 72.
180. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
181. Bradley, supra n. 72.
182. Michael A. Rebel! & jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story of School
Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 j. of Law & Educ. 167, 188 (2002).
183. Bradley, supra n. 67, at 17.
184. See Frederick M. Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks of Emphasizing Input Equity Over
School Performance, 6 Va. j. Soc. Policy & L. 11, 17 (Fall1998). See also joseph S. Patt, School Finance
Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in AtUudes, 34 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Liberties L. Rev.
547,550 (1999).
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with the litigation say that Virginia was not ready for an equity suit. 185
Public opinion about the suit was mixed. By many accounts, most of the
state was at least mildly supportive of the suit, and the editorials in most
of the state's major newspapers-including the Roanoke Times, the
Virginia Pilot, and the Washington Post-were supportive. 186
In the months before the suit was filed, however, an editorial in the
Richmond Times-Dispatch came out in strong opposition, declaring the
threat of litigation "a tactic of intimidation" by the "so-called Coalition for
Equity in Educational Funding, an organization of 41 school divisions
hoping to extract more tax money from the state." 187 The scathing editorial
said litigation would be "a bonanza for lawyers, but a costly drain for
taxpayers" and cited the litigation costs in neighboring Tennessee. 188 The
editorial suggested that the schools would not improve with the addition of
more funds, but needed instead, choice and competition, which would be
achieved by allowing parents "absolute power to select the school their
children will attend." 189 Thus, one reason some involved in the litigation
think it was unsuccessful was that public opinion was not strong enough to
demand redistributive attention from the courts.
Politics, therefore, was a main factor in the failure of the equity suit.
The second major factor was the constitutional history of the state's
education article, which was highly unfavorable to the Students' case.
B. Constitutional History

Academics disagree on whether the wording and constitutional
history of a state's education clause generally affects the court's decision
to uphold or strike down the state's funding scheme. 190 In Virginia,
185. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
186. Telephone Interview (Salmon), supra n. 162.
187. The Great Equalizer?, Richmond Times-Dispatch A12 (Oct. 3, 1990).
188. Id.
189. I d. As an interesting side note, it is unclear how a school choice proposal would improve
the rural schools that were plaintiffs in the suit. The editorial belies how little the Richmond paper
understood about the situation facing the rural schools.
190. See e.g. Robert M. jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State
Constitutions, 1997 BYU Educ. & L. ). 1, 19 ("Contrary to what a few uninformed courts and scholars
have concluded, there is consistency between success and the use of the education clause.");
Lundberg, supra n. 155, at 1135 (finding that "in states where the court has based its ruling primarily
on the education clause (as opposed to a ruling based primarily on equal protection grounds), the
amount of protection the education clause provides seems to make a difference in the judicial
finding"); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in
Basic Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 77 (1985); William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of
State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 16611669 (1989) (asserting that the strength of the clause affects the outcome of the case); Bill Swinford,
A Predictive Model of Decision Making in State Supreme Courts: The School Financing Cases, 19 Am.
Pol. Q. 336, 347 (1991) (finding a positive correlation between the strength of the education clause
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however, the case for the saliency of the Education Article's wording and
history is particularly strong because the article was written during the
first wave of equity litigation, and the constitutional history was carefully
constructed to avoid litigation: "The prospects for more litigation over
difficult and complex education quality and school funding issues were
prominent in the legislative discussion." 191
Unlike all prior constitutions, the 1971 constitution was written by the
General Assembly instead of by convention, and it was adopted by the
voters in November 1970. 192 With Assembly approval, Governor Godwin
had appointed a Commission on Constitutional Revision, comprised of
eleven esteemed members. 193
The Commission reported its
recommendations to the Governor and General Assembly in January 1969,
and the Assembly considered the Commission's recommendations in 1969
and early 1970. 194 Virginia's voters approved the constitution in November
1970, and the new constitution became effective on July 1, 1971. 195
The 1971 constitution brought an end to constitutionally-sanctioned
school segregation and "massive resistance" with the new Education
Article. Because the old constitution had not required local school
boards to operate public schools in their districts or to ensure that their
schools met minimum standards, massive resistance to school
desegregation was possible and perpetuated by state law. Such resistance
included localities' closing all public schools in a district or operating
schools of such poor quality that wealthier white students fled to private
schools and only the poorest students, who were usually black, were left
attending the public schools. 196 In crafting the Education Article, the
constitutional framers placed paramount importance on the retention of
local control over schools and on creating a "lawsuit-proof constitutional
history." 197
The framers recognized the glaring inequities in school funding and
quality around the state when they wrote the 1971 constitution and they
took steps to create a constitutional history that would protect the new
constitution from judicial attack. The recent decision in Burruss v.
and the likelihood that the court would strike down the education financing system). But see
Swenson, supra n. 156, at 1156.
191. Memo. in Support of Respt's Demr., supra n. 45, at 7; Telephone Interview (Terry), supra
n. 97 ("It was clear that the legislators were making a lawsuit-proofhistory.")
192. Scott, slip op. at 5.
193. Id.
194. Memo. In Support ofRespt's Demr., supra n. 45, at 2.
195. Id. at 2-3.
196. See Howard, supra n. 5, at 883-884; Commn. on Constitutional Rev., supra n. 5, at 253-254.
197. See Howard, supra n. 5, at 896; Commn. on Constitutional Rev., supra n. 5, at 256;
Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
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Wilkerson, lYH a school funding disparity suit brought by a Virginia county
under the federal constitution, focused the attention of the General
Assembly on the vulnerability of school funding systems to legal
challenge. In addition, Serrano v. Priest 199 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriquez200 were going on at the time, making the
Assembly acutely aware of the potential for future court battles over the
language they were constructing. The drafting of the Education Article
occurred very much in the shadow of this threat.
1. "Seek to"

A.E. Dick Howard, a professor at the University of Virginia Law
School, served as executive director of the Commission and worked with
the commissioners to create the draft that was recommended to the
General Assembly. 201 Article VIII, section 1 of the constitution that
Howard drafted read, "[t]he General Assembly ... shall ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and maintained." 202
Governor Godwin, who was worried that mandatory language would
invite lawsuits, lobbied the General Assembly to insert the words "seek
to" before the word "ensure," causing the article to read: "The General
Assembly ... shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high
quality is established and continually maintained." 203 Godwin cautioned
the Assembly,
The definition of the term "high quality" is so subjective as to invite any
citizen who disagreed with the State Board of Education or indeed with
the General Assembly to bring suit. It poses the gloomy prospect of
endless litigation, and very possibly endless expenditure of public funds
to fulfill the courts' decrees? 04

Thereafter, the House and Senate both rejected amendments that
attempted to repeal the words "seek to" and make Article VIII, Section 1
an enforceable mandate rather than an aspiration. 205 In debate over one
such amendment, Senator James C. Turk, a Republican, advocated a

198. Burrus v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
199. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
200. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
20 l. Szakal, supra n. 3, at 2.
202. Telephone Interview (Salmon), supra n. 162; Szakal, supra n. 3, at 2.
203. Va. Cons!. art. Vlll, § l.
204. Va. H., Proceedings and Debates Pertaining to Amendment of the Constitution, Extra Sess.
1969, Reg. Scss. 1970, at 9 (1969, !970) [hereinafter House Proceedings).
205. See House Proceedings, supra n. 204, at 259~260, 262; Va. Sen., Proceedings and Debates
Pertaining to Ame11dment of the Constitution, Extra Scss. 1969, Reg. Sess. 1970, at 209~215 (1969,
1970) [hereinafter Senate Proceedings].
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repeal of the "seek to" language specifically in order to address the
funding disparity issue:
Mr. President, gentlemen of the Senate, I thought one of the best jobs
that the Constitutional Revision Commission did was to commit the
State wholeheartedly to a system of high quality education. I am
mindful of what the Governor told us the first day we were here. But I
am also mindful of the fact that this Commission was made up of
eminently qualified judges and lawyers. They seem to have no trouble
with the problem of what "high quality" meant.
One of the things that has been wrong with our educational system in
the State of Virginia has been the difference in the quality of education
in different parts of the State. My amendment would merely take out
"seek to" which means nothing and leave "high quality education" so
that we would ensure to every school-age child in the State of Virginia a
high quality education. I, for one, am not worried about any lawsuit
that might develop over the words "high quality." 206
But the amendment for which Senator Turk advocated was decisively
rejected by a large majority, as was a similar amendment in the House. 207
Professor Richard Salmon, who was involved in the Scott litigation,
laments, "Now it's said in Virginia that you don't have to provide a high
quality education, you just have to look for one." 208

2. Divided Equitably?
The Commission also recommended language that would require the
General Assembly to "ensure that funds necessary to establish and
maintain an educational program of high quality are provided each school
division, and it shall take care that the cost of maintaining such programs
is divided equitably between the localities.... " 209 The General Assembly,
however, rejected the Commission's language and, instead, approved the
phrasing:
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in which funds are
to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program

206. Senate Proceedings, supra n. 205, at 209.
207. Hullihen W. Moore, In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the Education Article of the
Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev. 263,271 (1970-71). In one debate in the House,
Delegate Roy Smith explained why the House Committee substituted the language of aspiration for
the language proposed by the Commission: "The committee felt that to put into the draft of the
proposed Constitution language mandating an educational program of high quality would take away
any future General Assemblies' right to determine what is high quality and would in all likelihood
put that determination in the courts." House Proceedings, supra n. 204, at 242.
208. Telephone Interview (Salmon), supra n. 162.
209. Commn. on Constitutional Rev., supra n. 5, at 259 (emphasis added).
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meeting the prescribed standards of quality, and shall provide for the
apportionment of the cost of such program between the
Commonwealth and the local units of government comprising such
school divisions. 210
The Assembly, therefore, removed the language about "high quality" and
"divided equitably" from the section before submitting it to the people of
Virginia for ratification.

3. Expressio Unius
Furthermore, the framers-the Commission, Governor Godwin, and
the General Assembly-were acutely aware of the geographical
disparities in funding but chose not to include language that would
mandate equity. The statutory interpretation doctrine of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius means "inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of
the other." 211 The major criticism of the expressio unius doctrine is that
it falsely assumes that the legislature thinks through statutory language
carefully, considering every possible variation. That criticism is negated,
however, in a situation such as this one where history shows the
legislature actually did consider the alternatives.
The Commission's report specifically cited the funding disparities
that were occurring across the state in 1966-67 212 and acknowledged that
" [v) ariations in cost per pupil are great, as are variations in taxable local
resources per pupil." 213 Similarly, Governor Godwin spoke to the
General Assembly about the geographic disparity in funding, saying, "the
education gap continues to widen between our better and our poorer
schools. Our cities call for still more State aid, and many of our counties
are approaching the limit of their own resources." 214
Members of the General Assembly also acknowledged the disparities
while debating the constitutional revisions, saying, "[a]lmost all of us
recognize that one of the more serious problems existing in the
Commonwealth today is the disparity in the quality of education offered

210. See Va. Const. art. VIII,§ 2 (emphasis added).
211. See e.g. Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E.496, 499 (Va. 1938) (statute covering "any horse, mule, cattle,
hog, sheep, or goat" did not cover turkeys).
212. "[I]n the 1966-67 school year in Chesterfield County with a school population of 24,247
the per pupil cost of education was $439.57; while in Highland County with a school population of
633 the per pupil cost was $523.00." Commn. on Constitutional Rev., supra n. 5, at 254, fn. 7. "[I]n
the 1966-67 school year the relatively sparsely populated county of Buckingham paid only 2So/o of its
educational cost while the Commonwealth paid 55% and the Federal Government paid 17%.
Heavily populated Chesterfield County paid 66% of the cost of education in the same year and the
Federal Government paid only 3% and the Commonwealth 31 %." Id. at 255, fn. 9.
213. Commn. on Constitutional Rev., supra n. 5, at 260.
214. House Proceedings, supra n. 204, at 9.
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by the various school divisions." 215 Yet the final language of the
constitution that the General Assembly presented to the voters did not
mandate equality in resources among the school divisions.
The constitutional history of Virginia's education article, therefore,
clearly demonstrates that the framers did not intend to require equity.
While the circuit court and the supreme court were both quick to explain
that they were using plain meaning only, both courts were briefed
extensively on the constitutional history of the article, and both courts
were fully aware of what that history contained. In fact, Mary Sue Terry,
the Attorney General at the time of the suit, believes that the
constitutional history was the critical factor in the courts' decisions. 216
The carefully constructed history is thus the second half of the reason
why school finance litigation failed in Virginia.
V. RESPONSES AND EFFECTS

Although the equity litigation did not result in a favorable ruling
from the court, it succeeded in compelling the legislature to enact a
package of "disparity funding" and, more significantly, it incited a fervent
movement toward statewide, standards-based education. This section
first describes the legislature's response to the Scott litigation and the
standards movement that Virginia embraced in the wake of the equity
case. This section then focuses on the effects of the failed litigation in
terms of current funding and achievement disparities.
A. Legislature's Response

The General Assembly responded to Scott by passing a plan for $103
million in "school disparity funding" for the 1994-96 budget. 217 The
Assembly provided that funds would be distributed statewide on the
basis of numbers of students qualifying for free lunches and would be
used principally to reduce student-teacher ratios. The plan called for
rural and inner-city schools to receive more funds per pupil than
suburban schools, and for schools with more students who qualify for
free lunches to get more funds per pupil.m
Although the package was billed as a "plan to reduce disparities," it
actually increased disparities in some instances. First, because the
215. Jd. at 306.
216. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
217. joel Turner, Coalition: Disparity Plan is Not Enough, Roanoke Times & World News CI
(Feb. 22, 1994). The funding package was passed while the Scott case was still pending in the
supreme court. Id. See also Denslow, supra n. 20.
218. Turner, supra n. 217, at Cl.
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funding was tied to lowering class sizes, some rural counties were unable
to qualify for the funds. 219 Second, because of their large enrollments,
some of the wealthiest schools (in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., and
Richmond) received more than twice as much as some rural counties in
western Virginia. For example, Fairfax County in Northern Virginia
received $2.8 million and Henrico County near Richmond received $2.3
million, while Roanoke County in Southside Virginia received only
$327,376. Per pupil funding in those schools was $21 in Fairfax, $66 in
Henrico, and $24 per student in Roanoke. 220 Even more striking is the
disparity between Poquoson, a Tidewater city that was one of the leastfunded in the state, which received $11 per student, and the City of
Richmond, which received $85 per student. 221 The funding, therefore,
legitimately aided some of Virginia's core cities, where a large number of
children qualify for free lunches, but it did little to help the rural
Southwest counties who had brought the suit, "where many families who
qualify for free lunches are too proud to ask for a handout." 222
The General Assembly has continued to toy with school funding in
the years since Scott incited them to enact the $103 million disparity plan.
In fact, Virginia's legislature is one of the most active state legislatures in
terms of the number of education bills passed. In a recent study
encompassing the years 1994 through 1999, the overall trend in all states
is toward an increase in the number of education finance bills. 223
Virginia was second only to California in the number of state school
finance bills passed in the last year of the study; California legislators
passed thirty-eight bills, Virginia passed thirty-six, and the next closest
state-Oklahoma-passed only twenty-five. 224
None of those many enactments, however, has squarely addressed
the funding inequities across the state or the real funding needs of the
rural schools. Newspaper editorials at the time of the litigation expressed
hope that Governor George Allen and the General Assembly would
respond to the suit, even after the supreme court found that they had no
constitutional duty to do so, because the alarming disparities had been
highlighted and brought to the public's attention. 225 The negative
219. Failed Suit Doesn't Silence State-Aid Parity Plea, The Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk) AIO (Apr.
20, 1994) [hereinafter Failed Suit].
220. Turner, supra n. 217, at Cl.
221. David M. Poole, Wink Wink! Don't Let Legislators Fool You on Ethics, School Funding,
Commentary, Virginian Pilot (Norfolk) C3 (Apr. 3, 1994).
222. Id.
223. faith E. Crampton, Financing Education in the Twenty-First Century: What State
Legislative Trends of the 1990s Portend, 27 ). ofEdu. Fin. 479,483 (Summer 2001).
224. Id. at 482-483.
225. Failed Suit, supra n. 219, at AIO.
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decisions in the circuit court and supreme court, however, gave the state
government little incentive to engage in the politically-costly work of
closing the funding gap. The Coalition and their supporters had much
more political capital when they were murmuring about a lawsuit that
the state expected to lose than they did after they had filed and lost. 226
But while the legislative response engendered by the Scott case was weak,
the standards movement the case incited was vigorous and extensive.
B. Standards Movement
1. Standards of Quality

The 1971 Virginia Constitution mandated, for the first time,
standards of quality that the public schools must meet. 227 Section 2 of the
Education Article requires that:
Standards of quality for the several school divisions shall be determined
and prescribed from time to time by the Board of Education, subject to
revision only by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in which funds are
to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program
meeting the prescribed standards of quality, and shall provide for the
apportionment of the cost of such program between the
Commonwealth and the local units of government comprising such
school divisions. Each unit of local government shall provide its
portion of such cost by local taxes or from other available funds. 228

The standards mandated by the constitution were originally drafted by the
Board of Education and approved by the General Assembly in 1971, and a
new Basic Aid formula was developed in 1972 to fund the new
Standards. 229 Both the Standards of Quality and the formula have been
revised many times since their inception. Provisions in the original SOQ
were relatively easy to quantify, but as the SOQ was revised to be more and
more comprehensive, the requirements became harder and harder to cost
out. 230 The JLARC reports, discussed above, were an attempt to accurately

226. Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
227. Finch, supra n. 4, at 10.
228. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
229. joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Commn., Review of Elementary and Secondary School Funding
xiv (2001) [hereinafter )LARC III]. The Basic Aid formula was developed by a task force created by
the Governor to determine the methodology for financing the SOQ. The task force included
members of the General Assembly, staff members of the Attorney General's office, and DOE
officials, and they based their calculations primarily on statewide average costs.
230. Va. Educ. Assn., Report on Financing the Standards of Quality and Improving Teacher

Salaries iii (1982).
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determine the cost of funding the more comprehensive SOQ. 231
The SOQ defines such things as the basic skills students need to gain
from their education, the required student-teacher ratios for different
classes and groups of students, the Standards of Accreditation,
requirements for diplomas and certificates, teacher training and
professional development, public involvement, and a policy manual. 232
In addition, the SOQ directs the Board of Education to establish the
Standards of Learning educational objectives in all subjects, including basic
skills in communication, computation, critical thinking, problem solving,
decision-making, computer and technology proficiency, personal finances,
self-esteem, self-management, sociability, integrity, and honesty. 233 These
Standards of Learning ("SOLs"), adopted in the summer of 1995, represent
the culmination of the standards movement in Virginia; with the SOLs, the
Virginia Board of Education accomplished "a wholesale adoption of a new
and very specific list of standards."234
The state of Virginia, therefore, has had educational standards in
place for several decades. However, the current standards movement in
the state, which mirrors the nation-wide movement, is distinct from
previous efforts at standardization in both the specificity of the standards
and in the high stakes, to students and schools, of test results. This
current standards movement was touched off in 1990 when the Disparity
Commission urged the adoption of statewide standards as a substitute for
an increase in funding. The Commission recommended that the General
Assembly establish statewide education goals and curriculum by 1995,
which would be measured by a common statewide standardized test. 235
The SOLs were the realization of that standardization effort.
2. Standards of Learning

The Standards of Learning are minimum requirements in each grade
level, kindergarten through twelfth grade, in the four core subjects of
English, mathematics, science, and history and social science. As
explained in state Board of Education materials, "[t]he standards set
reasonable targets and expectations for what teachers need to teach and
students need to learn. Schools are encouraged to go beyond the
prescribed standards and to enrich the curriculum to meet the needs of

231. See JLARC I, supra n. 36, at Preface.
232. Va. Code§§ 22.1-253.13:1 to 22.1-253.13:8.
233. Va. Code§ 22.1-253.13:1(8).
234. Telephone Interview with Mickey VanDerwerker, Pres., Parents Across Va. United to
Reform SOLs (Apr. 12, 2003).
235. Bradley, supra n. 70, at 17.
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all students."236 The SOLs were developed through public hearings and
with the input of over five thousand people, including education experts,
parents, teachers, interested community members, and business
people. 237
School boards are required to implement the SOLs in their schools
by developing a program of instruction for kindergarten through the
twelfth grade that emphasizes "reading, writing, speaking, mathematical
concepts, computations, computer and technology proficiency, scientific
concepts and processes, citizenship, Virginia history, world history, U.S.
history, economics, government, foreign languages, international
cultures, health and physical education, environmental issues ... ",
geography, fine arts, and practical arts. 23 H
Testing is a major tenet of the standards movement. SOL testing
began in 1998 and includes end-of-course or end-of-grade tests in
English, mathematics, science, and social studies. 239 Schools, students,
and school districts are all evaluated on the basis of student scores on
these assessments, which commentators have called "draconian, high
stakes tests." 240 Any student who fails all four of the SOL tests in third
grade, fifth grade, or eighth grade must attend a summer school program
or other remediation program, and all students must pass at least six
exams in high school courses to be eligible for graduation. 241
In addition to the consequences for the individual student, student
achievement on the SOLs is now the primary basis of evaluating schools
for accreditation. 242 The Board of Education sets the Standards of
Accreditation, which are required by the SOQ to include student
outcome measures. Local school boards are responsible for maintaining
schools that meet the Standards of Accreditation and all schools are
reviewed annually to determine their accreditation status.w Schools

236. Va. Bd. of Educ., Standards of Learning Currently in Effect for Virginia Public Schools,
Foreword, <http:/ /www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Superintendent/Sols/foreword.pdf> (current version
available at< http:/ /www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Superintendent/Sols/home.shtmi> (accessed Feb. 28,
2004)).
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.

Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:1(C).
Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:3.
Telephone Interview (Salmon), supra n. 162.

241. Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:1; Va. Bd. of Educ., Requirements of the Standards of
Accreditation for Students, High School Graduation Requirements <http://www.pen.k12.va.us/
VDOE/Parents/soastude.htmi> (last updated in Sept. 2001); Telephone Interview (VanDerwcrker),
supra n. 234.
242. Bd. of Educ., Brief Summary Final Regulations, Regulations Establishing Standards for
Accrediting Public Schools in Virginia <http://www.pen.k 12.va.us/VDOE/ Accountability/
soabriefsum.pdf> (accessed Feb. 28, 2004); 8 Va. Code Ann.§ 20-131 et seq.
243. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:3 (D).
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identified for improvement submit corrective action plans and are
assisted by the Superintendent of Public Instruction in meeting the goals
of their plan. 244 By the 2003-04 school year, 75 percent of the third and
fifth graders in a school will have to pass the English test for the school to
be Fully Accredited. 245

3. Are the Standards of Learning a Subset of the Standards of Quality?
The relationship between the SOLs and the SOQ is unclear. The
Board of Education and JLARC both understand the SOLs to be part of
the SOQ, and the structure of the multiple standards suggests that they
are to be read as one comprehensive system. Two provisions in the SOQ
themselves, however, suggest that the SOLs are not to be read as a subset
of the SOQ.
The first provision in the SOQ that suggests the General Assembly
may not have intended for the SOLs to be part of the SOQ says that the
SOLs shall not be construed to be regulations as defined in§ 2.2 4001 of
the Administrative Process Act. That section says: '"Rule' or 'regulation'
means any statement of general application, having the force of law,
affecting the rights or conduct of any person, adopted by an agency in
accordance with the authority conferred on it by applicable basic laws."
The second provision says, "The standards of quality shall be the only
standards of quality required by Article VIII, Section 2 of the
Constitution of Virginia." 246 Presumably, the intent of these two
provisions is to attempt to eliminate any ability to sue based on the SOLs.
But many government bodies do not seem convinced: Despite these
provisions, two authoritative bodies-the Board of Education, which
writes and enforces the SOLs, and JLARC, a legislative commissionnonetheless believe the SOLs are part of the SOQ.
The Standards of Quality direct the Board of Education to determine
and prescribe Standards of Learning educational objectives for students
and local school divisions. 247 The Board of Education understands those
SOLs to be part of the SOQ: "As specified by the SOQ, the Standards of
Learning are the minimum grade level and subject matter educational
objectives that students are expected to meet in Virginia public schools.
The educational objectives describe the knowledge and skills 'necessary
for success in school and for preparation for life."' 248 The fact that the
244. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:3.
245. lld. of Educ., supra n. 242.
246. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:8.
247. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1-253.13:1.
248. Bd. of Educ., Glossary of Terms Related to Public Education
<http:/ /www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Parents/glossary.html> (accessed )an. 15, 2004).

in Virginia
The quoted
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body in charge of establishing the Standards of Learning understands
them as part of the SOQ is quite persuasive. Similarly, JLARC-which
also has persuasive authority as a General Assembly commissionunderstands the SOLs as part of the SOQ. The JLARC report says:
The Standards of Learning have been incorporated into the State's SOQ
framework. For example, the SOL are now important parts of
standards 1 (basic skills, selected programs, and instructional
personnel), 3 (accreditation), 5 (training and professional
development), and 6 (planning and public involvement) in the codified
SOQ.
While it is understandable that the SOL effort has required a substantial
portion of the time and attention of recent boards, it appears that other
aspects of the SOQ have experienced some neglect. 249
Thus, according to JLARC's understanding as laid out in its official
report, the SOLs are one aspect of the SOQ.
Furthermore, the structure of the Standards of Quality, Standards of
Learning, and Standards of Accreditation suggest that they form one
unitary system. The constitution requires that the Board of Education
determine and prescribe "[s]tandards of quality for the several school
divisions," subject to revision by the General Assembly. 250 Those
Standards of Quality are codified in §§ 22.1-253.13:1 through 22.1253.13:8 of the Code of Virginia. The Standards of Quality provide a
statutory basis for both the Standards of Learning and the Standards of
Accreditation. Standard l of the SOQ states that the Board of Education
shall establish educational objectives called the Standards of Learning to
carry out the goals of the SOQ and Standard 3 of the SOQ states that
Board of Education shall promulgate regulations establishing standards
for accreditation. 251 Thus, the Standards of Learning are the vehicle for
carrying out the Standards of Quality. The Standards of Accreditation, in
turn, rely on the Standards of Learning tests by conditioning school
accreditation and student graduation on SOL test performance. 252 Thus
the SOQ, SOLs, and SOA form an integrated structure of Standards.

language-"necessary for success in school and for preparation for life" -comes from the first
paragraph of §22.1~253.13:1 of the Code of Virginia, which says, "1be General Assembly and the
Board of Education believe that the fundamental goal of the public schools of the Commonwealth
must be to enable each student to develop the skills that are necessary for success in school and
preparation for life .... "(internal citation omitted).
249. )LARC III, supra n. 229, at 41 (emphasis added).
250. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
251. Va. Code§§ 22.1~253.13:1 to 22.1 ~253.13:8; see also )LARC III, supra n. 229, at 3.
252. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1~253.13:1.
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C. State of Education Today

Neither the legislative response nor the standards movement has
solved the funding problems that brought students and school districts
into court in the early 1990s. The overall level of spending has increased
somewhat since the Scott suit, but that's not saying much: state funding,
measured on a constant dollars per-pupil basis, dropped from 1990 to
1992, and not until 1998 did state funding again roughly equal 1990
levels. Furthermore, budget numbers from the most recent years suggest
the state is again sliding backwards: the state's planned spending level for
2002 was $4.015 billion, which is a 1 percent increase in actual dollars
over the 2001 spending level. On an inflation-adjusted, per pupil basis,
however, state funds were approximately $3,339 per pupil in 2002 as
compared to $3,389 per pupil in 2001. 253
The percentage of school funding that comes from the state is below
the national average. In Virginia, the state pays about 42 percent of
education costs, while the national state average is 50 percent. 254 Since
1993, the state has committed to paying 55 percent of the SOQ costs.
The total operating costs for schools, however, greatly exceed the SOQ
costs, resulting in a dilution of the state SOQ funds. 255 The result is that
the state actually pays only 42 to 47 percent of education costs. 256
Virginia's average teacher salary of $38,744 is also below the national
average, $41,820. 257

1. Funding Disparities
In addition, the funding disparities among school districts have not
decreased. In 2000, the lowest spending school district spent $6,164 per
pupil, while the highest-spending district spent $11,697. 258 Back when
the Scott suit was filed, the numbers were $3,819 in the lowest-spending
district and $9,119 in the highest-spending district. 259 Thus, the overall
level of spending per student has increased since Scott, but the $5,533
disparity in 2000 is remarkably similar to the $5,320 disparity in 1991. 260

253. )LARC III, supra n. 229, at 18-19.
254. ld. at 19-21.
255. Id. at ii, 5.
256. Id. at iii, 19-21.
257. !d. at 19-21.
258. Id. at xxix.
259. Turner, The Difference is Appropriation, supra n. 113, at E6.
260. In the 1991-92 school year, total per pupil expenditures ranged from $9,119 in falls
Church to $3,819 in South Boston. Id.
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Comparison of Lowest and Highest Composite Index Localities in 2000

261

Locality

Composite
Index

Local

State

Federal

State
Sales Tax

Total

Lee County

.19

$601

$4,543

$1,172

$675

$6,991

Petersburg
City

.23

$776

$3,960

$842

$587

$6,164

Falls
Church

.80

$8,798

$1,137

$179

$596

$10,710

Arlington
County

.80

$9,385

$1,182

$453

$677

$11,697

Strong evidence suggests that these funding differences are making a
difference. Virginia has identified thirty-four schools in nine districts as
needing improvement under the federal No Child Left Behind Act of
2001. Under the Act, a school is identified as needing improvement if it
fails to meet state achievement objectives in reading or math for two
consecutive years.
Schools in Lee County, Petersburg City, and
Portsmouth City-three of the five lowest spending districts and,
interestingly, three of the plaintiff districts in the Scott case-account for
twelve of the thirty-four schools listed. Schools in the city of Richmond
account for seventeen, leaving only five schools that need improvement
throughout the rest of the entire state. 262
Funding disparities, therefore, are as wide as they were before the
Scott litigation despite an apparent increase in the overall level of
funding. Paralleling the funding disparity story is a similar story of
achievement disparity: Despite apparent increases in student
achievement on test scores and other measures, achievement disparities
between the highest -achieving students and the lowest -achieving
students continue.

2. Achievement Disparities
According to standardized test scores from the mid -1970s (when the
Standards of Quality were enacted) through the present, Virginia's
students have consistently performed at or above the national average. 21i 3

261. )LARC III, supra n. 229, at xxix.
262. Va. Dept. of Educ., State Summary: Virginia Schools Identified j(>r Improvement Under the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001< http://www.pen.kl2.va.us/VDOF/src/vasrc-nclb.shtml>; see also
JLARC Ill, supra n. 229, at xxix.
263. The tests Virginia students have taken over the years include the Science Research
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Because the standardized tests used to assess students have changed over
time, and because students' scores tend to increase from the first year of
any given test until a new test is administered, it is difficult to compare
scores across a span of years. The table below excerpts the beginning and
ending years on two tests, the Science Research Associates Achievement
in 1974 (representing the beginning of the SOQ) and in 1980, and the
Stanford 9 in 1998 and 2000. It appears that since 197 4, students' scores
have dropped significantly in reading in grade 4; increased significantly
in reading in the later grades; remained about the same or increased
slightly in grade 4 math; and increased in later-grade math. 264
Nationally Normed Scores of Virginia Students on Standardized Tests 265
(National Avg. =50)
Year

Reading,
Grade 4

Reading,
Grade 11

Math,
Grade 4

1974-75

51

47

45

50

1980-81

63

47

59

50

Falll998

50

58

53

54

Fall 2000

53

60

60

55

Reading,
Grade 9

Math,
Grade 9

Math,
Grade 11

These test scores paint a mixed picture of student achievement in
Virginia; unfortunately, even that picture is deceptively cheery because
state averages do not show the poor job Virginia is doing educating
certain groups of children. The SOL tests, which were not instituted until
1998, can illustrate the test score gaps between ethnic groups.
Standards of Learning tests (discussed above) are given in grades
three, five, and eight, and in high school. The tests were first given in
1998, and students' scores have increased on all tests in the ensuing years,
including double-digit increases on twenty-three of the twenty-eight
assessments. 261i In 2002, the performance of Virginia's students improved
on twenty-three tests compared with the results from 2001, with
increases on some test scores as large as twenty-two and twenty-five
percentage points in that one year alone. In addition, none of the scores
on the remaining five tests decreased by more than four points.

Associates Achievement tests, the Virginia State Assessment Program tests, the Iowa Test of Basic
Skills, and the Stanford 9. )!.ARC I!I, supra n. 229, at 23.
204.

Jd.

265.

Jd.

266. Va. Bd. of Educ., Raising Student Ach:.:vement: A Standards of Learning Update, 1 (Feb.
2002) [hereinafter Raising Student Achievement].
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Cumulative improvements on SOL tests since the first tests were given in
1998 are even more dramatic. 267
The improvements are most
pronounced in the following classes:
1998 Pass
Rate (%) 268

2002 Pass
Rate(%)

Change
2001-2002

Change
1998-2002

33

72

+9

+39

35

78

+22

+43

High school Algebra II

31

77

+3

+46

High school World
History II

41

79

+14

+38

SOL Test
Grade 5 history and
social studies
Grade 8 history and
social studies

Thus, statewide, Virginia's students are improving dramatically as
measured by the SOL tests. Furthermore, 2002 pass rates are above 70
percent-the pass rate each school must have to be fully accredited-on
all tests except eighth grade English. 269 These results, however, mask two
deficiencies: First, while statewide average scores are above 70 percent,
the scores of students who are ethnic minorities are well below 70
percent on many tests. Second, while SOL test scores are improving,
students' scores on other standardized tests are stagnant or even
decreasing.
The racial gap in SOL test scores is profound. Virginia appears to be
doing a particularly poor job of educating its African American and
Hispanic students. Because the black-white gap is most often talked
about, it is instructive to look at the tests showing the largest gap in test
scores between Caucasian students and African American students in
2002. They are:
•

Grade 5 science, with a gap of thirty-two points. Caucasian students
had a passage rate of 86 percent and African American students had
a passage rate of 54 percent. Next to African American students,
Hispanic students had the lowest passage rate at 64 percent.

•

High school earth science, with a gap of thirty-one points.
Caucasian students had a passage rate of 80 percent and African
American students had a passage rate of 49 percent. Next to African

267. Va. Dept. of Educ., Div. of Assessment and Reporting, Virginia Standards of Learning
Assessments: Statewide Spring Passing Rates (Oct. 2002).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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American students, Hispanic students had the lowest passage rate at
56 percent.
• High school geometry, with a gap of thirty points. Caucasian
students had a passage rate of 83 percent and African American
students had a passage rate of 53 percent. Of the students whose
ethnicity was known, Hispanic students had the next lowest passage
rate at 71 percent. 270
The average black-white gap across all SOL tests in 2002 was twentythree points, and the smallest black-white gap was fourteen points in
high school English writing. The Hispanic-white gap on that test was 9
points. 271 More shocking, but also encouraging, is the finding that the
racial gap used to be even higher for the three tests detailed above; for
example, the 1998 black-white gaps were thirty-six points, thirty-eight
points, and thirty-four points, respectively. 272
But while the gap in SOL pass rates between black and white students
has been shrinking during the past five years, the SAT gap has widened:
black males' average SAT scores were lower in 2002 than in 1998, while
white males' average scores have risen since 1998. The resulting gap is
more than one hundred points. 273
The Southern Regional Education Board ("SREB") issued a report
comparing SAT scores from 1992 with scores from 2002. Virginia
showed slight improvements in both measures for the decade studied,
with a 3.5 percent increase in scores and a 2 percent increase in number
of test-takers. The average score in Virginia is still slightly lower than the
national average score, but the percentage of students taking the test is
much higher. 274
Comparison of SAT Scores and Percentage of Students Tested
in 1992 and 2002 275

Virginia

1992
% tested

1992
Av . score

2002
%tested

2002
Av . score

Point increase
from 1992-2002

66

995

68

1016

21

270. Va. Dept. of Educ., Div. of Assessment and Reporting, Virginia Standards of Learning
Assessments: Percent of Students Passing SOL Tests Spring 1998-2002, by Ethnicity (Oct. 2002)
[hereinafter Percent Passing by Ethnicity].
271. Id.
Id.
273. Parents Across Va. United to Reform SOLs <http://www.solreform.com/SATlook.htm>
(accessed Feb. 28, 2004).
274. S. Regl. Educ. Bd., ACT and SAT Scores in the South: The Challenge to Lead 5-6 (2003)
(available at <http:/ /www.sreb.org/main/highschools/college/ ACT_and_SAT.asp> (accessed Feb. 28,
2004)). The SREB notes that the lower the participation rate, the higher the average score will be.
275. Id.
272.
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Critics of the study complain that because students self-select to take
the SAT, and because the only students who need SAT scores are those
who plan to apply to college, SAT test results can only reveal the
attainments of the highest-achieving students. In addition, the SREB
report looks at only two snap-shots in time, separated by a ten-year span.
Parents Across Virginia United to Reform SOLs addressed this
shortcoming by dividing the data into two five-year periods: the five
years pre-SOL testing and the five years post-SOL testing. Parents Across
Virginia discovered that while Virginia's SAT scores did rise over the
ten-year periods, they were already rising in the years before the SOL
testing started, and they have not risen any faster since then. The rate of
increase during the post-SOL years was no greater than during the preSOL years. 276 More disturbing is the trend apparent in the SAT
participation rate. As noted by SREB, the participation rate rose slightly
during the ten-year period. However, "[i]n the first five years of the
1992-2002 decade, participation rates rose by about 9.5 percent and in
the last five years of the decade, participation rates have actually
declined." 277
Finally, while SOL scores have risen, scores on other standardized
tests do not reflect those gains. National Assessment of Educational
Progress ("NAEP") tests are given in math, reading, science, and writing.
Each subject area is not assessed annually and not every student takes the
test or answers all of the questions on a given test. Instead, the tests are
administered in the fourth and eighth grades and groups of students take
a sampling of the questions rather than the entire test. Based on those
scores, the NAEP makes inferences about achievement of the statewide
student population as a whole. 278
The NAEP reading tests were administered in 1992, 1994, and 1998.
Scores on the reading test dropped precipitously from 1992 to 1994, and
then increased from 1994 to 1998 but not to 1992 levels. Because scores
dropped nation-wide in 1994, it is difficult to make comparisons based
on this NAEP data. 279 The Virginia Board of Education does rely on this

276. Parents Across Va. United to Reform SOLs, supra n. 273.
277. Id. (emphasis in original).
278. Parents United Across Va. to Reform SOLs, How Are Virginia Students Faring on Other
Measures of Student Achievement? < www.solreform.com/achievement.htm> [hereinafter How Are
Virginia Students Faring].
279. When NAEP reading scores dropped across the nation in 1994, it was widely believed that
the drop had more to do with technical problems with the tests rather than a drop in student
achievement. How Are Virginia Students Faring, supra n. 278.
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data, however, to misleadingly state: "Since the adoption of the revised
Standards of Learning in 1995, the average score of Virginia fourth
graders on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
reading test has risen five points and is now three points higher than the
national average." 280
NAEP math tests were given in 1990, 1992, 1996, and 2000. NAEP
scores rose between 1996 and 2000 for both fourth grade and eighth
grade, but, importantly, the percentage of students excluded from NAEP
testing increased as well. The more students that are excluded, the more
likely it is that mean scores will increase, because the excluded students
tend to be the lowest performers. Virginia's rate of exclusion of students
increased at one of the fastest rates in the nation. Finally, NAEP science
tests were given in 1996 and 2000 to 8th graders. Despite SOL pass rates
that rose from 71 percent in 1998 to 82 percent in 2000, NAEP Science
scores did not differ significantly from 1996 to 2000. Thus rising SOL
scores are not completely reflected in NAEP scores. 281
Similarly, the Stanford 9 test scores do not strongly reflect the rising
SOL scores. 282 The Stanford 9 is a standardized test that has been
administered in fourth, sixth, and ninth grade in reading, math, and
language.n 3 Scoring is reported as a percentile ranking, comparing each
child to a normed sample, and the average score is 50. In the fourth
grade, Stanford 9 scores are up four percentile points since 1998 (from
fiftieth percentile to fifty-fourth percentile), while third grade SOL
reading pass rates have risen from 55 percent to 72 percent. Math has
gone up from the fifty-third percentile to the sixty-first percentile on the
Stanford 9, while the rise in third grade math SOL pass rates skyrocketed
from 63 percent to 80 percent. Similarly, in grade six, the Stanford 9
scores in reading rose one percentile point from 1998 to 1999 and then
have stagnated since then at the fifty-ninth percentile; fifth grade pass
rates on the reading SOL, however, rose from 68 percent to 78 percent.
In math, Stanford 9 results showed a jump from the fifty-eighth to sixtysixth percentile between 1998 and 2001; fifth grade math SOL results
showed a tremendous increase in students passing from 47 percent to 71
percent. Finally, in the ninth grade, average percentiles on the Stanford 9
math and reading tests have remained invariable at the sixtieth percentile
in reading and the fifty-fifth percentile in math. Meanwhile, pass rates
on the SOL reading test between 1998 and 2002 rose from 65 percent to
2SO. Raising Student Achievement, supra n. 266, at 1.
2Sl. See How Are Virg1nza .Students Paring, supra n. 278.
282. Interestingly, the Stanford 9 and SOL tests are developed by the same company. See id.
283. The General Assembly stopped fundmg Stanford 9, so students will no longer be taking
these tests. See Telephone Interview (VanDerwerker), supra n. 234.
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69 percent, and SOL math pass rates rose from 53 percent to 71 percent.
Thus the Stanford 9 test scores do not reflect the gains that the SOL test
scores report; while there have been increases in fourth grade Stanford 9
scores, scores in the upper grades have remained stagnant. 284
Finally, other measures of achievement also suggest that Virginia's
students are not doing as well as the SOL test results suggest. The
percentage of students earning standard and advanced diplomas are
dropping; the percentage of Virginia students making a three or better on
advance placement ("AP") tests is dropping and Virginia is not keeping
pace with national gains in AP test participation rates; and the
participation rate in SAT II is dropping while national participation is
going up. 285 These funding and achievement disparities could be the
factual basis for a successful adequacy suit in Virginia today.
VI. OPENING A WINDOW: VIRGINIA Is RIPE FOR AN ADEQUACY SUIT

It is generally far easier for a court to look at a funding system and
declare that the numbers are not equal than it is for the court to look at
an educational system and say that it is not adequate. 286 In Virginia,
however, several factors may make the courts especially likely to be
receptive to adequacy claims, including precedent set by the Scott case,
state politics and balance of power issues, favorable language in the
JLARC report, and the structure of state standards currently in place.

A. Precedent Set by Scott
While the history of the constitution demonstrated the framers'
intention not to require equity, the constitution's adequacy requirement
is clear and, importantly, confirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Scott. 287 In that decision, the court said that some portions of
the Education Article were aspirational and other portions were
mandatory. The court held that in Section 1, the language requiring a

284. Parents United Across Va. to Reform SOLs, Homepage <http://www.solreform.com>
(accessed Feb. 28, 2004).
285. See Parents United Across Va. to Reform SOLs, Beyond /R!ising SOL {Plass {R!ates
<http://www.solreform.com>.
286. Patt, supra n. 184, at 562.
287. In addition, the lower court decision in Scott, which was upheld by the supreme court,
contains strong language supporting an adequacy claim. judge Hughes wrote in his opinion letter
that "the only funds which must he provided are those necessary to cover the 'cost of maintaining an
educational program meeting the prescribed standards of quality."' Scott, slip op. at 7 (internal
notations omitted). judge Hughes concluded that "the Virginia Constitution does not now mandate
equality of funding for school districts in Virginia, except for meeting minimum educational
standards." Id. at 9.
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system of free education was mandatory, but the language regarding
seeking to ensure an educational program of high quality was
aspirational. 288 All of the language of Section 2 concerning the standards
of quality, however, was mandatory. Therefore, the court stated, "the
provisions of Article VIII plainly mandate that each school division
provide an educational program meeting standards of quality as
determined and prescribed by the General Assembly." 289 In finding
against the Students, the court reiterated that "the Constitution requires
the General Assembly to determine the manner of funding to provide the
cost of maintaining an educational program that meets the prescribed
standards of quality ... and the Students do not contend that the manner
of funding prevents their schools from meeting the standards of
quality." 290 Thus the supreme court decision-along with a plain reading
of the constitutional language and an understanding of the segregationending constitutional history-suggests that an adequacy suit would
succeed in Virginia.

B. State Politics and Balance of Power
In addition to strong factual and legal bases, an adequacy suit in
Virginia stands a better chance than the equity suit did because of state
politics and balance of power issues. Adequacy appeals to norms of
fairness and opportunity and speaks to assisting the most troubled school
systems rather than making the high-achieving school districts a focus. 291
As discussed in a previous section, the high-spending Northern Virginia
school systems resented being labeled the state's "fat cats," and legislators
and voters from those areas balked at any equity proposals that would
level-down the state's education funding and achievement. An adequacy
suit, in contrast, leaves room to applaud high-achieving districts while
assisting less successful ones.
In addition, adequacy litigation appeals to many high cost urban
school districts. During the Scott litigation, Richmond and Fairfax
complained that they must educate more free-lunch kids and more kids
for whom English is a second language, making their costs higher and
justifying the greater expenditure on their schools. With adequacy
remedies, aid can be directed to schools with students who are not
achieving, not just to the poorest school districts over all. 292

288. Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142.
289. Id. at 141-142.
290. Id. at 142.
291. Heise, supra n. 84, at 1175.
292. Id.

240

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2004

On the balance of the power front, the Virginia courts are more likely
to deal with adequacy than to punt it back to the legislature the way they
did with equity. Taxing, funding, and spending claims raise political and
policy questions for which the legislature was designed, making some
courts hesitant to override the legislative funding scheme for separation
of powers reasons. 293 In the Scott equity suit the supreme court said,
"[W]hile the elimination of substantial disparity may be a worthy goal, it
is simply not required by the Constitution. Consequently, any relief to
which the Students may be entitled must come from the General
Assembly." 294 The court thought the Scott case presented a non justiciable
policy question rather than a constitutional question. Because the
adequacy question is more clearly constitutional than the equity question
was, the courts may be more comfortable deciding for plaintiffs: 295
"Though it may be true that most education cases feel the heat of
separation of powers issues, plaintiffs that give the court a road of
adjudication clearly within its jurisdiction and responsibility ... most
often lead the court to a decision in favor of the education clause." 296 An
adequacy question under the education clause grounds the court's work
in concrete constitutional language that "gives the courts a measuring
stick and leaves them to constitutional interpretation."297
C. ]LARC III

In 2001, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission issued
its third report on school funding in Virginia. This most recent JLARC
study was more comprehensive than the earlier studies, and its findings
are more dramatic: JLARC III recommended that the state address its
funding of the state standards, the sufficiency of the standards, and state
recognition of costs beyond SOQ levels-changes that would, in total,
amount to $2.7 billion in additional state funds to education over the
2003-04 biennium. 298

293. Jensen, supra n. 190, at 34~35.
294. 443 S.E.2d at 142~ 143.
295. Jensen, supra n. 190, at 34~36
296. Id. at 37.
297. Jd. at 36~37.
298. JLARC Jll, supra n. 229, at vii, xxiii. JLARC identifies a variety of actions the state could
pursue to "enhance its support of elementary and secondary education" and divides them into three
tiers. I d. at xxii. Tier One involves adjusting the methodology for estimating the SOQ costs (infra)
and meeting the state share of those costs; completing the objectives in the first tier would cost $480
million more in 2003 and $580 more in 2004 than what the state spent in 2002. Tier Two would
provide state funding for operating costs that are not now part of the SOQ but that are being funded
by the majority of school divisions; the second tier would cost $361 ~$508 million more in 2003 and
$375~$526 million more in 2004 than what the state spent in 2002. JLARC made recommendations
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The results of this most recent JLARC study are reported at length
below, but it is important to note here that the findings and language of
the report are highly favorable to proponents of an adequacy suit. The
study declares that the state's estimation of the cost to fund the SOQ is
too low because it is outdated and inaccurate. For example, after tracing
the messy history of the state's current costing-out approach, JLARC
states: "As a result, the State appears to be in a weaker position to defend
its cost estimates as being realistic in relation to current costs for
education." 299 Furthermore, the report finds that the SOQ standards
themselves are set too low compared to the schools' prevailing
practices. 300 Such findings, by the legislature's own committee, seem to
make an adequacy claim especially likely to succeed.
D. Ironically, the Standards Themselves

The people of Virginia added the Standards of Quality to their
constitution in 1971 and in 1995, the Board of Education added the
Standards of Learning. The Standards give Virginia, in effect, an
"educational standard of care" courts can rely on when assessing the
adequacy of a school funding system. 301 Not only will such standards
give the courts concrete measures to look to in invalidating the current
scheme, but they will guide the court in determining what scheme would
be constitutionally valid.
One of the biggest criticisms of school finance litigation deals with
judicial competency to define what an "adequate education" is. The
Standards already in place in Virginia will allow state courts to rely on
legislative and executive branch definitions of adequacy rather than
having to craft their own. Thus, the Virginia courts can adopt the state's
own definition of adequacy and simply direct the legislature to provide
the funding for students and districts to meet the standards. Relying on
existing standards does not completely solve the judicial competency
problem, however, because the Virginia courts still must determine the
relationship between standards and inputs. Which standards define
under Tier Two that the General Assembly consider funding a state share of the cost of the prevailing
levels of elementary resource teachers and/or a twenty~one to one pupil~teacher ratio at the
secondary school level. Id. at xxv. In addition, Jl.ARC recommended that the General Assembly
consider expanding support for at~risk preschool. Id. at xxvi. Tier Three addresses the policy goals
of increasing state funding of capital costs (debt service) and increasing teacher salaries to meet the
national average; funding the final tier would cost $43-$296 million more in 2003 and $44 to 331
more in 2004 than what the state spent in 2002. The total estimated increased cost for funding all
three tiers is $884 million to $1.3 billion in 2003 and $1 to $1.4 billion in 2004. Id. at xxiii.
299. I d. at 52.
300. ld. at xxii.
301. Heise, supra n. 84, at 1175-1176.
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"adequate" in Virginia? And, what resources are necessary to achieve
adequacy?
1. Defining Adequacy

Standards-based adequacy can be defined by output standards, such
as a requirement that all students demonstrate reading and math
proficiency, or by input standards, also called "opportunity to learn"
standards, that require minimal levels of school funding, resources, and
conditions. 302 The court in Kentucky, for example, used an output
standard based on student achievement, stating that an adequate system
must provide a child with seven essential competencies listed in the
decision. 303 The Abbott decisions in New Jersey, on the other hand, used
an input standard, requiring wealthy and poor districts to be funded at
the same level for regular education, plus poor districts to get additional
funds and programs for special needs children in those districts. 304
Some commentators have defined a hybrid system, called a content
and resource standard, like the one used in Wyoming. There the court
directed the legislature to define the best educational system, cost it out,
and then fund it. The court made clear that lack of resources was not an
excuse to under-fund education, and they included additional revenue
for legitimate educational needs and variances among individuals,
groups, and local conditions. 305 Virginia would most likely define
adequacy using a hybrid system similar to Wyoming's. In Wyoming, the
court directed the legislature to define the best educational system and
fund it. In Virginia, by contrast, the court would look to the previouslyestablished Standards of Quality and Standards of Learning as the state's
definition of an adequate or minimum education and require the
legislature to fund it. 306
The state repeatedly calls the requirements of the SOQ and SOLs a
"minimum" that school divisions must provide. The statutory scheme
that establishes the SOQ, for example, says: "Each local school board
shall provide, as a minimum, the programs and services, as provided in
the standards of quality prescribed above, with state and local funds as

302. Deborah A. Verstegen, Judicial Analysis During the New Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The New Adequacy in Education, 24 ). ofEduc. Fin. 51 (1998).
303. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. See also Verstegen, supra n. 302.
304. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Priorities, and Practicalities: New Jersey's Experience
Implementing the Abbott V Mandates (unpublished paper on file with author).
305. See Verstegen, supra n. 302.
306. While the Standards of Learning are clearly output-based measures, the Standards of
Quality are a combination of output criteria (basic skills students must acquire) and input criteria
(student-teacher ratios).
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apportioned by the General Assembly." 307 Information the Board of
Education released to explain the SOLs to the public defines the SOLs as
"minimum requirements in each grade level, kindergarten through
twelfth grade, in the four core subjects." 308 The materials further explain
that the SOLs set a foundation level only: "The standards set reasonable
targets and expectations for what teachers need to teach and students
need to learn. Schools are encouraged to go beyond the prescribed
standards and to enrich the curriculum to meet the needs of all
students." 309 Finally, the decisions in Scott understand the Standards as
setting the minimum that the schools must provide: the circuit court
repeatedly called the SOQ "minimum educational standards" that are
required by the Virginia Constitution. 310 Similarly, the supreme court
reiterated that the General Assembly must devise a system that "meets
the prescribed standards of quality" and said that the students do not
have a claim against the state because they "do not contend that the
manner of funding prevents their schools from meeting the standards of
quality." 311 Virginia, therefore, is ripe for an adequacy case that would
ask the courts to declare the minimum educational standards embodied
in the SOQ and SOLs to be the state's own definition of "adequacy" and
require the legislature to provide a system that fully funds those
Standards.

2. Setting an Adequate Level of Funding
What does it mean to require the legislature to devise a system that
fully funds the Standards? As mandated by the constitution, the Board of
Education prescribes the Standards (subject to revision by the General
Assembly) and the General Assembly determines how the Standards are
to be funded. Currently, the Board of Education attempts to determine
the minimum reasonable cost per pupil statewide of meeting the SOQ,
and that cost is multiplied by the number of pupils in each school
division to determine the estimated total cost of meeting the SOQ in each
division. That estimated cost of meeting the SOQ for each division is
then divided between the division and the state according to the
composite index. 312 The primary criticisms of this scheme are, first, that

307. Va. Code Ann.§ 22.1·253.13:8 (emphasis added).
308. Va. Bd. ofEduc., supra n. 241 (emphasis added).
309. ld.
310. Scott, slip op. at 9 ("For the foregoing reasons the Court finds that the Virginia
Constitution does not now mandate equality of funding for school districts in Virginia, except for
meeting minimum educational standards.").
311. Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142.
312. Dickey, supra n. 21, at 8.
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the state's estimation of the cost to fund the SOQ is too low because it is
outdated and inaccurate and, second, that the SOQ standards themselves
are set too low compared to the schools' prevailing practices.
First, the state's estimation of the cost to fund the current Standards
is unreasonably low. 313 The current approach is the result of a complex
history that started in 1972 when a task force and the Board of Education
recommended using statewide averages to calculate the costs. 314 The
General Assembly never fully funded that estimate, however, so there has
always been a funding gap between the actual, average costs and the state
funding. 315 The method for determining the level of funding underwent
further revisions in 1986 when JLARC recommended a new formula,
based on aggregated minimum costs in a way that far understated the

313. The Virginia Education Association believes that the SOQ have been under-funded since
their inception, citing a difference in the number of teachers included in the formula versus the
number needed to teach students what the SOQ require; unrealistic assumptions about teacher
salaries and inflation rates; and the General Assembly's reduction in funding below the level
requested by the Board of Education. Va. Educ. Assn., supra n. 230, at iii (1982). The attorney
general who defended the state in Scott says, "Everyone knows the state formula costs out the cost of
education very low, so really a locality has to expend some tax effort on schooling if they want it to be
funded adequately." Telephone Interview (Terry), supra n. 97.
314. )LARC III explained many of the deficiencies of the current funding system through an
examination of the history of SOQ funding. The first method of estimating the cost of funding the
SOQ was developed by a task force in 1972. The task force included members of the General
Assembly, staff members of the Attorney General's Office, and Department of Education (DOE)
officials, and they based their calculations primarily on statewide average costs. The DOE adopted
the task force's methods and presented their estimation of the costs of funding the SOQ to the
General Assembly. The General Assembly, however, did not fully fund the estimated cost, electing,
instead, to set a lesser amount in the Appropriations Act. The difference between the Board of
Education's estimated SOQ and the Assembly's estimated SOQ was known as the "funding gap."
)LARC III, supra n. 229, at xiv. The funding gap caused considerable controversy and dissatisfaction,
and in 1985, the General Assembly asked )LARC to develop a new methodology for estimating SOQ
costs. The )LARC methodology-based on complex formulas that took actual school division costs
into account, rather than being based on available funds, as the first SOQ estimation had been-was
adopted the General Assembly in 1986. )LARC Ill, supra n. 229, at xvi.
The )LARC formula has been used since 1986, but changes made to the calculations in the
1990s have made the foundation cost estimates less realistic. The state dropped support costs for
professional, administrative, and clerical staff from the cost estimating process entirely. Now the
SOQ specifically state that school divisions are to employ the support personnel necessary to the
operation of a school system, yet the state does not include those costs in estimating what it takes to
fund the SOQ. )LARC lll, supra n. 229, at 39. In addition, the state's present approach to estimating
costs fails to keep cost estimates current. Under the state's approach, costs are only inflated from the
first year of a biennium to the second year of that same biennium, and not for future years. For
example, the budget accounts for inflation from 2000 to 2002 in estimating costs for the upcoming
biennium, but then uses the 2002 costs to represent SOQ costs in 2003 and 2004. Id. Similarly, the
SOQ systematically estimates teacher salaries too low. The state's approach to estimating SOQ
teacher salaries for each new biennium begins with the assumption of no increase in salaries, even
though average teacher salaries have increased in twenty-six of the last twenty-seven years. )LARC
Ill, supra n. 229, at 39-40.
315. )LARC Ill, supra n. 229, at xiv.
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actual costs to school districts of funding the SOQ. 316 Finally, during the
fiscal crisis of the 1990s, the state made several changes that further
reduced the estimated SOQ costs, including dropping support costs for
professional, administrative, and clerical staff from the cost estimating
process entirely (while retaining the mandate that schools employ such
personnel). 317 The result is an unreasonably low estimation of the costs
to fund the SOQ.
The JLARC report provides recommendations for adjusting the
state's current approach to estimating SOQ costs in order to provide a
more accurate and more current estimate. If those adjustments are
implemented, the state's 55 percent share of SOQ costs for the 2003-2004
biennium would be $1.06 billion more than what the state spent in
2002. 318
It is worth noting that the General Assembly has the authority to set
the SOQ funding level at whatever level they choose. 319 However, the
state's long-standing presumption has been that SOQ costs must be
realistic in relation to prevailing costs. 320 In 1972, the Task Force on
Financing the Standards of Quality said implicit in the constitution are
the ideas that "the Standards of Quality must be realistic in relation to
current education practice" and that the "estimate of the cost of the
Standards of Quality must be realistic in relation to the current costs for
education." 321 Opinions from the Attorneys General of the state, at each
time when the issue has been examined, repeatedly assert that the cost
estimation must be realistic. In 1973, the Attorney General stated that in
"estimating the cost of implementing the Standards, the General
Assembly must take into account the actual cost of education rather than
developing cost estimates based on arbitrary figures bearing no
relationship to the actual expense of education prevailing in the
Commonwealth." 322 Similarly, the Attorney General in 1983 said: "The
legislative determination of cost may not be based upon arbitrary
estimates with no reasonable relationship to the actual expense." 323
The second major criticism of the SOQ funding is that the SOQ
316.

VEA Prescription, supra n. 58, at 2.

317. JLARC Ill, supra n. 229, at 39.
318. Id. at 40. The JLARC-revised foundation program would entail $480 million more in 2003
and $580 million more in 2004 as compared to 2002. This cost includes the $389 million that is
needed to fully fund the SOQ based on the state's current cost approach. I d.
319. JLARC III, supra n. 229, at 51.
320. Id. at 38, 51.
321. JLARC Ill, supra n. 229, at 38, 51 (quoting Task Force on Financing the Standards of
Quality for Virginia Public Schools (Dec. 1972 and July 1973)).
322.

JLARC: III, supra n. 229, at 38.

323. Id. at 38, 51.
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standards themselves are set too low compared to the schools' prevailing
practices. In 1991, the Disparity Commission's first conclusion was that
"all divisions, regardless of their local wealth, currently exceed the
standards ... suggest[ing] that the divisions view the [SOQ] as too
minimal to provide a quality foundation program." 324 Subsequent studies
have found that, even during the financial crisis of the early 1990s, all
schools exceeded the SOQ for course offerings and staffing. 325 Today, the
great majority of schools provide more instructional and resource staff
and smaller classrooms than are recognized by the SOQ. In the
aggregate, all school divisions employ more instructional staff than are
calculated by the state model. 326 Schools also provide smaller class
sizes-while the SOQ for first grade maximum class size is thirty
students, in 1999-2000, not a single school in any division in the state had
a first grade classroom of thirty students. Ninety-five percent of school
divisions had no first grade classrooms with more than twenty-six
students, and half of the school divisions had first grade classrooms no
larger than twenty-two students. 327
These reports indicate that the Standards of Quality are not
adequately defining a foundation program for Virginia. And although
the Board of Education has free reign to set the Standards, subject to
revision by the General Assembly, "the Standards cannot be prescribed in
a vacuum but must be realistic in relation to the Commonwealth's
current educational needs and practices."m To be realistic in relation to
the state's current needs and practices, the state must raise the Standards
to include the practices and personnel that the schools consider
minimally adequate. The JLARC report recommends increasing funding
to include costs for practices that the majority of school divisions already
engage in, including employing substantially more instructional and
resource staff than are recognized by the SOQ cost model and having
much smaller class sizes than are allowed under the SOQ. 329
VII. CONCLUSION
The story of equity litigation in Virginia runs across four Aprils:
from April 1991, when the Coalition issued its ultimatum to the

324. Denslow, supra n. 20, at 6 (quoting (;ov.'s Commn. on Educ. Opportunity for All
Virginians, Final Report 3).

VEA Prescription, supra n. 5H, at 5. See also )LARC Ill, supra n. 229, at 104.
326. )LARC Ill, supra n. 229, at 122.

325.

327.

Id. at 125.

328. Id. at 43, quoting Attorney (;en era! opinion in 1973.
329. Id. at xxii, 122-125.
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governor, to April 1992, when the Coalition voted to file the Scott suit, to
April 1994, when the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the state
constitution does not require equity in school funding. However, the
larger story of school finance in Virginia runs across many more Aprils
than four. With its beginnings in the Education Article of the 1971
constitution, the statewide debate about education funding continues
today. On May 28, 2003, the Board of Education invited the latest round
of debate when they voted to expand the definition of a "basic education"
and to increase funding by an additional $323 million a year. 330 Just as
the disparity debates in the 1990s occurred in the shadow of threatened
equity litigation, the current debates over the Standards of Quality and
state funding occur in the shadow of possible adequacy litigationlitigation for which Virginia appears especially ripe, given the invitation
in Scott and the claim-buttressing effect of the state standards.

330. Rosalind S. Helderman, Virginia Board Rethinks Basics of Education, Washington Post B4
(May 29, 2003).

